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Abstract—The deployment of the fifth-generation (5G) wireless
communication services requires the installation of 5G next-
generation Node-B Base Stations (gNBs) over the territory and
the wide adoption of 5G User Equipment (UE). In this context,
the population is concerned about the potential health risks
associated with the Radio Frequency (RF) emissions from 5G
equipment, with several communities actively working toward
stopping the 5G deployment. To face these concerns, in this
work, we analyze the health risks associated with 5G exposure
by adopting a new and comprehensive viewpoint, based on
the communications engineering perspective. By exploiting our
background, we debunk the alleged health effects of 5G exposure
and critically review the latest works that are often referenced to
support the health concerns from 5G. We then precisely examine
the up-to-date metrics, regulations, and assessment of compliance
procedures for 5G exposure, by evaluating the latest guidelines
from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE),
the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Pro-
tection (ICNIRP), the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and
the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
as well as the national regulations in more than 220 countries.
We also thoroughly analyze the main health risks that are
frequently associated with specific 5G features (e.g., multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO), beamforming, cell densification,
adoption of millimeter waves, and connection of millions of
devices). Finally, we examine the risk mitigation techniques based
on communications engineering that can be implemented to
reduce the exposure from 5G gNB and UE. Overall, we argue
that the widely perceived health risks that are attributed to 5G
are not supported by scientific evidence from communications
engineering. In addition, we explain how the solutions to minimize
the health risks from 5G (including currently unknown effects)
are already mature and ready to be implemented. Finally,
future works, e.g., aimed at evaluating long-term impacts of 5G
exposure, as well as innovative solutions to further reduce the
RF emissions, are suggested.
Index Terms—5G, health risks, health effects, EMF exposure,
EMF regulations, EMF metrics, assessment of compliance, 5G
features, risk mitigation.
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Fig. 1. Word cloud of the first five pages of Google results for the search
terms “5G health risks” (excluding from the word cloud the search terms).
I. INTRODUCTION
The rolling out of Fifth-generation cellular network (5G)
networks is a fundamental step to enable the variegate set
of services offered by 5G across the world. The deployment
of 5G networks requires installing new 5G next-generation
Node-B Base Stations (gNBs) over the territory, as well as
the diffusion of 5G User Equipment (UE) among the users.
Historically, the large-scale adoption of each new technology
has always been accompanied by a mixture of positive and
negative feelings by the population [1]. Nowadays, a similar
controversy involves the 5G technology, i.e., a non-negligible
number of people firmly convinced that 5G constitutes a real
danger for human health [2]. As a consequence, the words
“5G” and “risks” are often associated together, with a negative
impact on the perception of 5G among the population. For
example, Google retrieves more than 88 million results when
searching the terms “5G health risks”. As graphically shown in
Fig. 1, the words appearing in the search results (excluding the
search terms) often include negative nuances and expressions
of concerns. Fuelled by the social media, the sentiment of
fear against 5G is rapidly spreading across the world, with
entire communities/municipalities (and even whole countries)
actively involved in stopping the deployment of 5G technology
[3]–[5], as well as diffuse sabotages of towers hosting 5G
equipment [6]–[8].
The fear of 5G technology is mainly due to a biased
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Fig. 2. 5G communications engineering is the glue to analyze the different
disciplines involved in the assessment of health risks from 5G exposure.
feeling among the population, which is often driven by weak
theories (a.k.a. pseudoscience), developed without solid scien-
tific evidence. In this context, a common opinion is that the
exposure to ElectroMagnetic Fields (EMFs) generated by 5G
gNBs and 5G UE triggers severe health diseases. Although
the research community well knows that there are no proven
health effects from an EMF exposure kept below the maximum
limits enforced by law, the health risks associated with 5G are
overly perceived by the general public.1 This is (likely) due
to multiple reasons, which include both rational and irrational
aspects. In general, we observe: i) a widespread fragmentation
of researches across the different disciplines that are involved
in the health risks assessment of 5G, ii) a diffuse feeling of
a suspect against the institutions that are supposed to control
the health risks of 5G, and iii) a continuous fabrication of fake
news (misinformation), which generally convey the message of
severe health risks triggered by 5G exposure in an immediate
and catching way compared to the scientific community. For
example, the misinformation or “infodemic” related to the
connection between EMF exposure from 5G gNB and the
infection of Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) disease [9] is
currently very widespread in non-scientific communities.2
In this scenario, analyzing the scientific literature targeting
the health risks of 5G is a fundamental task on one side
and a challenging (and multi-faceted) problem. Indeed, the
health risks assessment of 5G covers several disciplines,
which include (to cite a few): medicine, biology, physics,
economics, and laws. Although we recognize the relevance
of each of the previous fields, the scientific research about
health risks associated with 5G is frequently polarized towards
a single aspect of the whole picture, with little attention to the
other areas. For example, medical studies are often focused
on assessing the health diseases triggered by 5G exposure
(including legacy mobile generations), with little emphasis on
the meaningfulness of the adopted test conditions. Also, the
conditions of the experiments are often very conservative and
pretty far from the real settings of the radio equipment under
operation in a deployed network. Since it is challenging to
achieve a unique view of health risks across all the involved
disciplines, the population tends to believe in the large number
1In line with the recommendations of international organizations (such
as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Telecommu-
nication Union (ITU)), we also advocate the need of continuing to investigate
possible - yet still unknown at present - health effects due to 5G exposure.
2The “infodemic” expression has been used by the WHO to describe the
excessive amount of misinformation regarding COVID-19 pandemic.
of fake theories/allegations claiming severe health risks trig-
gered by 5G. Apparently, this issue also severely increases the
sense of suspect against the institutions devoted to controlling
health risks.
Given this background, a key question naturally emerges: Is
it possible to scientifically analyze the health risks associated
with 5G through holistic work spanning across the different
disciplines that are involved in the problem? Our ambitious
goal is to provide an answer to this intriguing question.
More concretely, we adopt a 5G communications engineering
perspective as the glue that links the research works from
the different fields into a unique big picture. As sketched in
Fig. 2, communications engineering is a common denominator
for all the disciplines involved in assessing the health risks
associated with 5G. For example, communications engineering
can provide insights about realistic patterns of power radiated
by 5G equipment, allowing a realistic assessment of 5G
exposure. On the other hand, communications engineering can
drive the design of new 5G equipment and protocols tailored
to the minimization of the EMFs and, consequently, of the
health risks. In addition, the communications engineering can
provide indications about the effectiveness of the laws that
regulate the 5G exposure, e.g., to assess if some laws are too
conservative or too relaxed compared to the real conditions
at which 5G devices operate. In a nutshell, communications
engineering is the passe-partout to analyze the health risks of
5G.
Our key contributions include:
1) the analysis of the medical researches focused on long-
term EMF exposure, by exploiting the 5G communica-
tions engineering knowledge;
2) the evaluation of the EMF metrics and the EMF regu-
lations across all the countries in the world from the
perspective of 5G communications engineering;
3) the overview of the methods to assess the exposure
compliance w.r.t. the maximum limits when considering
5G equipment;
4) the analysis of the main 5G and beyond 5G technology
features and their potential impact on the health risks;
5) the discussion of the mitigation techniques based on
communications engineering that can be implemented to
reduce the health risks of 5G.
A. Paper Positioning
Tab. I reports the positioning of our work w.r.t. the relevant
papers [10]–[16] already published in the literature. Although
we recognize the importance of such previous works, to the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper targeting the
analysis of health risks due to 5G by adopting a communi-
cations engineering perspective in a comprehensive and in-
depth manner. Specific aspects of our work (and not covered
by previous papers) include: i) a comprehensive approach that
covers the health risks associated with exposure from both 5G
gNBs and 5G UE; ii) a detailed analysis of the different 5G
EMF metrics and the different 5G EMF regulations defined
by international organizations (ICNIRP, Institute of Electri-
cal and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)), federal commissions
3TABLE I
POSITIONING OF THIS WORK AGAINST OTHER RELEVANT PAPERS ANALYZING THE HEALTH RISKS OF 5G TECHNOLOGY.
Work Year Health Effects from 5G Exposure 5G Exposure Metrics, Regulationsand Compliance Assessment Health Risks of 5G Features 5G Risks Mitigation
[10] 2018
Partially covered: authors
mainly focused on works
investigating the biological
effects of pre-5G technologies
(including generic mm-Waves).
Not covered Not covered Not covered
[11] 2018
Partially covered: i) brief
overview of works investigating
the health risks of pre-5G
technologies, ii) review of
the works investigating health
effects from generic mm-Waves
(not radiated by 5G antennas).
Partially covered: i) brief
overview of the FCC
regulations, ii) no discussion
about other international
regulations, iii) compliance
assessment procedure only
briefly mentioned.
Partially covered: i) possible ef-
fect of 5G frequencies (only
mm-Waves are mentioned, while
sub-GHz and sub-6GHz fre-
quencies are not reported at all),
ii) impact of gNB densification
only briefly analyzed.
Not covered.
[12] 2018 Not covered
Partially covered: i) only inci-
dent field EMF for gNB and no
metric for UE, ii) impact of na-
tional regulations on gNB plan-
ning in a single country, iii) In-
ternational Commission on Non-
Ionizing Radiation Protection
(ICNIRP) regulations briefly in-
troduced, iv) compliance assess-
ment procedure tailored to a sin-
gle country.
Brief discussion, no compre-
hensive overview of the related
works.
Partially covered: network
based solutions for gNB.
[13] 2019
Partially covered: focus is on the
research works investigating bi-
ological effects due to exposure
from generic RF sources (not
tailored to 5G emissions).
Partially covered: i) exposure
metrics briefly mentioned, ii) in-
cident EMF strength taken into
account, iii) international regu-
lations only briefly mentioned.
Not covered Not covered
[14] 2019 Not covered
Partially covered: i) Review of
exposure metrics for gNB (and
not for UE), ii) Brief overview
of one international regulation
and a set of national regula-
tions (with a focus on Poland)
for limiting the maximum EMF
strength, iii) overview of a
generic procedure for compli-
ance assessment of exposure,
iv) international compliance as-
sessment procedures only briefly
mentioned.
Partially covered: i) brief
discussion on the impact of
Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
(MIMO), mm-Waves and
densification without reviewing
the literature.
Partially covered: authors
briefly discussed the impact
of strict regulations and the
monitoring activities based on
measurements.
[15] 2020
Partially covered: i) brief
overview of the alleged health
effects from RF exposure,
ii) brief summary of medical
studies investigating the impact
of RF exposure on health.
Partially covered: i) detailed
overview of exposure metrics,
ii) brief overview of the inter-
national guidelines (with a fo-
cus on UE), iii) no overview
of national regulations stricter
than international guidelines, iv)
assessment of compliance only
introduced.
Covered in terms of basic 5G
features (MIMO, densification,
mm-Waves)
Partially covered in terms of
network based and regulation
based solutions (with a focus
on EMF mitigation).
[16] 2019 Not covered
Partially covered: i) exposure
metrics for gNB and UE, ii)
brief overview of international
exposure regulations, iii) no
detailed analysis of country-
specific exposure regulations, iv)
limited analysis of compliance
assessment procedures.
Not covered
Partially covered: i) network
based (limited to resource al-
location), ii) device based.
T
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s
w
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k
2020
Full coverage of: i) basic prin-
ciples of Radio Frequency (RF)
exposure, ii) overview of the
main allegations against 5G ex-
posure (updated on 2020), iii)
analysis of the animal-based and
the population-based studies rel-
evant to 5G.
In-depth review with main con-
tributions: i) coverage of 5G ex-
posure metrics for UE and gNB,
ii) analysis of international re-
gulations (updated on 2020), iii)
analysis of local regulations and
their impact on 5G deployment
(data from more than 225 coun-
tries), iv) analysis of the state-of-
the-art compliance assessment
procedures (updated on 2020)
Comprehensive analysis of the
impact from: i) MIMO and
beamforming, ii) gNB densifica-
tion, iii) mm-Waves, iv) connec-
tion of millions of devices, v) co-
existence with legacy technolo-
gies (2G/3G/4G, radio and TV
broadcasting, weather satellites)
Comprehensive overview of
the solutions for gNB and UE:
i) device based, ii) architec-
tural based, iii) network based,
iv) regulation based.
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Fig. 3. Organization of our work.
(Federal Communications Commission (FCC)) and even single
nations (by extracting data from more than 225 countries); iii)
the review of the latest guidelines from IEEE, International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and ITU to perform the
compliance assessment of 5G exposure; iv) the risk analysis
of the set of 5G features that are associated with health issues
by the population; and v) the review of the main risk mitigation
techniques at a device, architectural, network, and regulation
levels.
B. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized by following the scheme
reported in Fig. 3. Sec. II analyzes the main health effects
of RF exposure under the light of 5G communications. This
section is also tailored to a critical review of the (recent)
studies aimed at finding connections between the emergence
of tumors and exposure to RF devices from the perspective of
the real settings at which 5G equipment will operate. Sec. III
quantifies the health risks by considering 5G exposure. To this
aim, we shed light on exposure metrics, exposure regulations,
and compliance assessment procedures relevant to the context
of 5G. We then examine in Sec. IV the main allegations
of health risks associated with 5G features (e.g., adoption
of mm-Waves, the proliferation of 5G antennas, the large
adoption of MIMO and beamforming, and the connection of
millions of devices), by analyzing the relevant literature from
the communications engineering perspective. We then discuss
in Sec. V the main techniques that can be put into place to
minimize the (potential) risks of 5G exposure at the device,
architectural, network and regulation levels. Finally, Sec. VI
concludes our work.
II. HEALTH EFFECTS FROM 5G EXPOSURE
We perform our analysis under the following avenues: i)
basic principles of RF exposure, ii) summary of the alleged
health effects from RF exposure, iii) overview of the relevant
medical studies in the context of 5G communications, iv)
critical review of these medical studies from the perspective
of 5G communications engineering.
A. Basic Principles of RF Exposure
The exposure from EMF can be categorized according to the
effects on the cells generated by the electromagnetic waves.
In particular, we distinguish between ionizing radiations and
non-ionizing radiations. The former category includes the
waves that have enough energy to remove the electrons from
the atoms in the living cells, causing the atom to become
ionized. For example, X-rays with frequencies in the range
3×1016 [Hz] - 3×1019 [Hz] and gamma-rays with frequencies
larger than 3×1019 [Hz] fall within the ionizing radiation. The
cells exposed to ionizing radiation can either die or become
cancerous, thus posing a risk for the health effects. On the
other hand, EMFs belonging to the non-ionizing radiation
group are composed of waves that do not have enough energy
to ionize the cells, thus (likely) avoiding cancer and death
for the exposed cells. However, the waves may have enough
energy to vibrate the molecules, causing a possible health
issue.
In this scenario, exposure from RF communications equip-
ment falls within the non-ionizing radiation category. More
specifically, the biological effects of RF radiation can be
further classified into thermal effects and non-thermal effects.
Focusing on the thermal effects, this group is characterized
by an RF exposure that can produce a heating of the exposed
tissues. An example of EMF source introducing thermal effects
is the micro-wave oven (although this device is not intended
to be used for RF communications). In this context, the
mechanism that triggers the raising of the temperature in the
exposed tissues is well understood and deeply analyzed in
the literature, since the massive adoption of radio equipment
for broadcast transmission [17]. To face this issue, regulatory
authorities (e.g., the European Commission (EC) in Europe
and the FCC in the USA), international commissions (e.g.,
ICNIRP) and international organizations (e.g., IEEE) define
maximum RF exposure limits that allow preventing the heating
effects on the exposed tissues.
Regarding the non-thermal effects, the majority of the
literature and reports of international organizations state that
there is not a clear causal correlation between EMF exposure
levels generated by RF sources operating below maximum
limits defined by law and emergence of biological effects, see,
e.g., the Swedish radiation safety authority report [18], WHO
and ITU statements [19]–[21], and recent ICNIRP guidelines
[22]. However, since the mechanism by which the RF exposure
may cause non-thermal effects is still not entirely known (if
there is any), it is essential to continue the research in this
field.
Fig. 4 on the right shows the typical conditions of EMF
exposure from RF devices, i.e., UE and base stations. In
general, UE radiate close to users, by generating an EMF
that is localized either on the head or chest. On the other
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hand, base stations radiate over the whole body and large
portion of the territory compared to UE. However, the EMF
generated by base stations tends to rapidly decrease in intensity
as the distance from the RF source increases. Moreover, a
shielding effect from base station EMF occurs inside buildings.
Therefore, the exposure from base stations is, in general, lower
compared to the one radiated from UE. Despite this fact,
the population associates higher health risks to base station
emissions w.r.t. UE radiation. In the following, we provide
more details about the alleged health effects of RF exposure.
B. Alleged Health Effects from RF Exposure
Fig. 4 on the left sketches the (main) health diseases that
are associated with RF exposure. Although some diseases have
been only observed in animals (and not in humans), the debate
about possible health consequences due to RF exposure is a
hot (and controversial) topic. To shed light on this aspect, we
briefly summarize in the following the alleged health effects
(including severe and not severe ones).
Cancer. The International Agency on Research on Cancer
(IARC) listed non-ionizing RF radiation from cell phones in
Group 2B as “Possibly carcinogenic to humans” in 2010 [23],
[24]. This action was taken based on different experiments
that analyze the carcinogenic effect on animals, which were
exposed to EMF levels generated by RF equipment [25]–
[28]. More recently, different works [29]–[32] have found a
statistically significant increase of rare cancers (i.e., glioma
malignant tumors in the brain, glial tumors of the heart, and
parotid gland tumors) associated to RF exposure in rats.
Skin Effects. The RF exposure with high power density can
lead to an increase in the temperature of the exposed body
tissue [33]. However, a modest localized heat exposure can
be compensated by the human body’s heat regulation system.
High doses of absorbed RF exposure can cause a sensation of
warmth in the skin, causing mild skin burns [34].
Ocular Effects. High levels of RF exposure with suffi-
ciently high power density may cause several ocular effects
[35], including cataracts, retina damages, and cornea issues.
Glucose metabolism. RF exposure may affect the Glucose
metabolism process in human cells [36]. The effect can be
noticed in the body organs exposed to high levels of EMFs,
e.g., the brain.
Male Fertility. According to a subset of studies (see e.g.,
[37]–[39]) high levels RF exposure may be associated with
negative effects on reproductive health in terms of sperm-
fertilizing ability. However, the connection of such effects with
RF exposure from communications equipment is to our best
knowledge scientifically not proven.
Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity. Some individuals report
that RF exposure causes several sensitivity symptoms to them,
e.g., headache, fatigue, stress, burning sensations, and rashes.
However, many independent studies (see, e.g., [40], [41]) have
demonstrated that such symptoms are not correlated with the
levels of RF exposure.
Spreading of the COVID-19 Disease. Recently, different
fake theories claim that there is a connection between the
RF from 5G equipment and the spreading of the COVID-19
disease [42]. In particular, the fake theories include:
• higher infection rates for regions of territory exposed
6to RF from 5G experimental trials (e.g., Wuhan region,
Lombardy region) compared to those not covered by 5G
[43];
• a dangerous interaction at a cell level between the De-
oxyriboNucleic Acid (DNA) and radiofrequency radiation
(RFR) from 5G equipment, causing a fatal inflammation
of lungs;
• a supposed interaction between the RiboNucleic Acid
(RNA) of the COVID-19 virus and the mm-Waves of
5G devices .
Such fake theories are not based on any scientific evidence, al-
though they are widespread among the population. According
to the UK National Health Service (NHS) [44], the diffusion
of fake theories trying to connect COVID-19 and 5G is
outrageous and dangerous.
Oxygen Effects. Another widespread allegation trying to
link RF from 5G equipment and health diseases include i) a
supposed oxygen absorption of 5G equipment out of the lugs,
and ii) the increase of carbon dioxide due to the cutting of
the trees to improve the signal coverage of 5G. Focusing on
i), this allegation is not based on any scientific base. Focusing
on ii), there is no plan to cut the trees to improve the signal
coverage. As a result, the claimed increase in carbon dioxide
emissions due to 5G is fake news.
Summary and Next Steps. Several health effects are asso-
ciated with RF exposure, ranging from scientific-based ones to
allegations based on fake theories. In the following subsection,
we provide more details about the works that aim at shedding
light on the connection between exposure from 5G equipment
and the emergence of tumors, which is one of the most
controversial aspects brought to the attention of the general
public. We intentionally leave apart skin, ocular, and glucose
metabolism effects, as these phenomena are observed only
for EMF levels consistently higher than the ones radiated by
5G equipment. Therefore, using 5G equipment under realistic
conditions guarantees that such effects do not occur in practice.
Similarly, we also skip additional analysis about male fertility
and electromagnetic hypersensitivity, as their connection with
5G communications is not scientifically proven [45], [46].
Other health effects, which are based on hoaxes and fake
theories, are not further discussed.
C. Relevant Medical Studies in the Context of 5G Communi-
cations
We then focus our attention on the medical studies that are
relevant to the exposure from 5G communications. We divide
the related works according to the type of experiment, which
can be either animal-based or population-based.
1) Animal-based Studies: In this category, experiments are
conducted on living animals (e.g., rats and mice), exposed to
EMFs to mimic the exposure from gNBs and UE. The number
of works falling in this category is vast, with hundreds of
animal-based studies that analyzed the potential health effects
from RF exposure over the last four decades (see, e.g., [47]–
[52]). However, the majority of works presents multiple issues,
including an insufficient duration of the experiment to extract
long-term indications, and/or a too-small number of animals
to derive statistically significant conclusions which are not
subject to large biases. To face these issues, different inter-
national organizations (such as WHO, National Toxicology
Program (NTP), and other international bodies) have provided
guidelines for the procedures that need to be followed by
animal-based studies that investigate the emergence of severe
diseases (e.g., cancer) [53]–[58]. For example, the promoted
guidelines define a minimum number of animals to be used
(e.g., at least 50 animals for each group), a minimum temporal
duration of the experiment (e.g., 2 to 3 years), and a minimum
number of EMF intensity levels (e.g., 3) [59].
In this scenario, the most recent (and relevant) studies that
fulfill the above requirements are the NTP study [29], [30] and
the study of the Ramazzini Institute [31]. In the following,
we provide more details about each of the aforementioned
research works.
NTP Study. NTP performed in [29], [30] one of the
longest bioassay conducted so far to evaluate the impact of
EMF exposure from RF equipment on rats and mice. In the
experiments performed by NTP, the animals were exposed to
RF in special chambers for several hours per day until the
natural death. The total duration of the experiment was set to
2 years, with an initial assessment done after the first 28 days,
and a final one performed at the end of the experiment. RF
equipment used to generate the EMF employed frequencies in
the sub-GHz band for [29] and in the mid-band (i.e., above
1 [GHz] and below 6 [GHz] bands) for [30]. The radiated
power of the RF equipment was adjusted to satisfy a given
level of whole-body exposure in the chamber, with different
exposure levels assigned to the chambers. In addition, the
generated EMF levels were continuously monitored in each
chamber, to verify the adherence of the exposure to the EMF
level imposed during the experiment.
Focusing on the outcomes of the studies, we refer the
reader to [29], [30] for a detailed analysis, while here we
report a concise summary. In brief, the study conducted
over the sub-GHz frequency [29] found clear evidence of
carcinogenic activity in Sprague-Dawley male rats due to
malignant Schwannoma of the heart. However, the same clear
evidence of heart Schwannoma incidence was not found when
considering the female rats. Besides, the incidence of other
tumors (e.g., malignant glioma of the brain) was also related
to the RF exposure (when considering male rats again). In
general, other severe diseases were also observed, without
however, a clear connection to the RF exposure level. Focusing
then on the study adopting the mid-band frequencies [30], no
clear evidence of tumors was found by considering male or
female rats. Eventually, the incidence of severe diseases may
have been related to RF exposure (although the observed cases
were not statistically significant). Finally, the outcomes of [29],
[30] are also analyzed by [60], concluding that RF exposure
may be capable of causing an increase in DNA damage.
Ramazzini Institute Study. This research work evaluated
the impact of RF exposure on Sprague-Dawley rats [31]. More
specifically, the rats were exposed from prenatal life until death
to a EMF generated by a RF for several hours per day. Like
the NTP studies, the rats were divided into multiple groups,
each of them exposed to different EMF levels. The study
7found a statistically significant increase in the occurrence of a
single disease (i.e., the heart Schwannomas), which was only
observed in male rats exposed to the highest EMF level. No
statistically significant increase w.r.t the exposure was found
for the other diseases. Moreover, female rats did not report
a statistically significant increase for any of the diseases.
According to the authors, their findings corroborate the NTP
studies [29], [30] and previous epidemiological research on
cellular phones, e.g., [25]–[28], thus making necessary a
revision of the IARC classification of RF exposure [24].
2) Population-based Studies: The studies belonging to this
category aim at investigating the relationship between people
affected by severe diseases (e.g., brain tumors) and the level
exposure from base stations and/or UE. We do not intention-
ally focus on population-based studies tailored to base stations
exposure, due to the following reasons:
1) base stations represent a minor source of exposure com-
pared to UE (as proven by previous works e.g., [61],
[62]);
2) the exposure from base stations tend to be notably re-
duced as the distance between the base stations, and the
user is increased (see, e.g., [63], [64]) and more in general
when indoor conditions are experienced (see, e.g., [65]);
3) previous population-based studies (see, e.g., the note [66]
of the American Cancer Society and the comprehensive
work of [67]) did not found any causal relationship
between the exposure from base stations and the increase
in the risk of developing tumors.
Focusing then on population-based studies on UE exposure,
it is well known that this RF source represents a major
source of exposure in proximity to users (see e.g. [61], [62]).
Therefore, we consider here population-based studies that
aim at finding a causal correlation between emergence of
tumors and UE exposure. The main works performed in the
past, which are relevant also in the context of 5G, are: i)
the INTERPHONE study [27], [68], ii) the Danish cohort
study [69], [70], iii) the million Women study [71] and iv)
the CEFALO case-control study [72]. In the following, we
provide more details about each study.
INTERPHONE Study. The INTERPHONE Study [27],
[68] was conducted by IARC. The research, based on a
very-large case-control approach, was performed across 13
countries in the world during the years 2000-2012. The project
goal was to study the impact of UE usage in people that devel-
oped severe diseases (i.e., glioma, meningioma, and acoustic
neuroma), which may be connected to the usage of UE. The
number of people involved in the study was quite important,
i.e., more than 5000 patients with glioma or meningioma and
1000 patients with acoustic neuroma. Also, a similar group of
people, not affected by any of the tumors mentioned above,
was also monitored. The adopted methodology involved sev-
eral aspects (e.g., personal interviews and validation studies)
in obtaining, as much as possible, reliable data about UE
usage (e.g., duration and frequency of the calls), as well as
other relevant information, e.g., UE model, network operator,
localization of the calls, user mobility and adoption of headsets
or hands-free devices.
The results of the study [27], [68] did not prove any
connection between the usage of UE and the risk of developing
glioma, meningioma, or acoustic neuroma. Eventually, an
increased risk of glioma for the largest RF exposure level
was observed. However, the presence of biases and errors
in the data prevented a causal interpretation of such results.
The reduction of these biases is targeted by [73], taking into
account the INTERPHONE data collected in Canada during
the years 2001-2004. By applying a probabilistic multiple-
bias model to address the (possible) biases at the same time,
the authors demonstrated that there was little evidence of an
increase of tumors with the rise in UE usage. Eventually, the
importance of investigating possible long-term effects due to
the heavy usage of UE was advocated by the team involved
in the INTERPHONE project.
Danish Cohort Study. The goal of the Danish cohort study
[69], [70] was to investigate the risks of developing tumors for
Danish people having a subscription with a cellular operator
against the remaining of the Danish population not having any
subscription. The study was updated continuously throughout
the years, being the first version spanning the years 1982-
1995 [69] and the latest one covering the 1990-2007 period
[70]. The number of persons taken under consideration is huge,
being the number of subscribers in [70] larger than 380000.
The study did not show any link between the use of UE - even
for more than 13 years - and the risk of developing tumors of
the central nervous system. However, the principle adopted to
distinguish between exposed people and not exposed people
is solely based on their subscription with a mobile operator,
without going into more in-depth details like the ones taken
into account by the INTERPHONE project.
Million Women Study. A wide-scale approach is also
pursued by the Million Women study [71]. The methodology
involved a postal questionnaire, which was completed by 1.3
million middle-aged women in the UK for different times
during the years 1999-2009. The survey included specific
questions to assess UE exposure, which was posed two times
during the considered period. The results of the study [71]
showed that UE use was not associated with an increased
incidence of glioma, meningioma, or tumors of the central
nervous system. However, it is important to remark that the
study is based on self-compiled questionnaires, and therefore
bias and errors may have been (unintentionally) introduced by
the participants.
CEFALO Case-Control Study. The CEFALO case-control
study [72] investigated the impact of UE exposure on young
children and adolescents (with age 7-19) that developed brain
tumors between 2004 and 2008 in Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
and Switzerland countries. More than 350 patients were inter-
viewed about UE usage (i.e., number of calls and call duration)
and other relevant information, including, e.g., type of opera-
tor, number of subscriptions, starting and ending date of each
subscription, adoption of hands-free devices, position of the
UE during the usage, and (eventual) changes in the UE usage.
Whenever possible, the retrieved information was also double-
checked by analyzing the logs that were made available by
mobile operators in a subset of countries. The outcomes were
then compared against a group of other adolescents/children,
8not affected by brain tumors, thus acting as control subjects.
Results confirmed that children/adolescents regularly using UE
were not statistically significantly more likely to have been
diagnosed with brain tumors compared to subjects not using
the UE. Also, no increased risk in developing brain tumors
was observed for children/adolescents receiving the highest
exposure. Eventually, the subscription duration was statisti-
cally significant w.r.t. the risk of developing a brain tumor for
a small subset of the participants, whose activity information
was retrieved from the logs of the mobile operators. However,
as recognized by the authors of the CEFALO study [72], this
outcome might be affected by multiple factors, including i)
a small cardinality of children/adolescent considered in the
subset (only 35% of case-patients and only 34% of control
subjects), ii) the fact that the UE might have been used by other
people in the family and/or friends (i.e., not by the considered
subject), iii) the possible presence of a reverse causality effect
(i.e., children/adolescents affected by brain tumors use more
frequently their UE compared to the ones not affected by the
disease). Finally, the authors concluded that their work could
not support a causal association between the use of UE and
brain tumors.
D. Review of the Studies from the Perspective of 5G Commu-
nications
We now review both the animal-based studies and the
population-based ones from the perspective of 5G commu-
nications.
1) Animal-based Studies: We compare the NTP and Ra-
mazzini Institute studies [29]–[31] against 5G equipment un-
der the following key metrics: i) operating frequencies, ii) test
chambers vs. real deployment, iii) maximum radiated power,
iv) power management, v) EMF exposure levels, vi) specific
absorption rate (SAR) levels, vii) transmission and modulation
techniques.
Operating Frequencies. We recall that 5G will operate in
three main frequency bands:
1) sub-GHz band (i.e., < 1 [GHz]);
2) mid-band (i.e., between 1 [GHz] and 6 [GHz]);
3) mm-wave (i.e., with frequencies in the order of dozens
of GHz and more).
In this scenario, the NTP studies [29], [30] adopt frequencies
belonging to the sub-GHz band and to the mid-band. More
in-depth, the 900 [MHz] frequency used by [29] is very close
to the one in use by 5G in the sub-GHz band. In Italy, for
example, this frequency is set to 700 [MHz]. On the other
hand, [30] exploits the 1900 [MHz] frequency, which is not
adopted by 5G but still comparable with the frequencies used
by this technology in the mid-band (i.e., typically close to
3500 [MHz]). Focusing then on the Ramazzini Institute study
[31], the adopted frequency is equal to 1800 [MHz], which is
again comparable to the 5G frequencies in the mid-band.
Eventually, it is important to remark that none of the studies
[29]–[31] investigate the impact of frequencies in the mm-
Wave band, whose waves have very different properties (e.g.,
less penetration in inner tissues) compared to micro-waves. A
natural question is then: Why do the studies in [29]–[31] not
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Fig. 5. Test conditions adopted in the NTP experiments. Multiple RF
sources provide active exposure, while two stirrers (one horizontal and one
vertical) are used as passive elements to generate an uniform exposure in the
environment.
investigate mm-Wave? To answer this question, we need to
remind that [29]–[31] assume to adopt 2G technologies (not
5G), for which the use of frequencies in the mm-Wave band
was not possible. As a result, we can claim that the studies
[29]–[31] are only partially representative of 5G frequencies.
Test Chambers vs. Real Deployment. A second aspect,
which is often underestimated by the general public, is the
comparison of the chambers used to perform the test against
the real environment in which 5G equipment operates. We
initially focus on the test chambers of the NTP studies [29],
[30], which are also sketched in Fig. 5. We refer the reader
to [74] for a detailed description, while here, we report the
salient features. In brief, the NTP studies employed chambers
whose dimensions are comparable to a small room. In each
chamber, the rat cages are positioned in the center, with
different levels of cages that are vertically stacked. Inside the
chamber, many standard gain antennas are placed. The exact
number of deployed antennas is not provided (neither in [29],
[30] or in [74]). Besides, two elements, called stirrers, are
placed on top and on the side of the chamber. Each stirrer is
used as a target when setting the antenna tilting (with a subset
of antennas directed towards the top stirrer, and the other ones
towards the side stirrer). The stirrers are then used as passive
elements to reflect the radiation and generate a uniform EMF
across the chamber. In this scenario, both the antennas and the
stirrers are placed in close proximity to the exposed rats.
Focusing on the test conditions adopted in the study of
the Ramazzini Institute [31], the rat cages are disposed of
in a torus structure around the RF source, as sketched in
Fig. 6. Moreover, a minimum distance of 2 [m] is ensured
between the RF source and the rat cages, to achieve far-
field conditions. Eventually, the whole structure is placed in a
chamber (not shown in the figure for the sake of simplicity)
that is completely shielded, in order to create a uniform EMF
in the room.
We then compare the test conditions of the studies [29]–[31]
against a realistic 5G deployment of a macro gNB, sketched
in Fig. 7. More in detail, we consider a 3.5 [GHz] omni-
directional gNB, mounted on a pole, and then placed on a
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Fig. 7. Realistic conditions adopted in 5G gNBs deployments (macro sites).
The exposed users in Line of Sight are always at dozens of meters from the
radiating 5G gNB.
roof of a building. A similar deployment, exploiting a three
sectorial 5G gNB, is analyzed in [75]. In this scenario, the roof
of the building delimits an exclusion zone from the center
of the 5G gNB. Such a zone is intended to be accessible
only by the technicians that need to perform maintenance
operations on the 5G gNB. Clearly, this zone is forbidden
to the general public, which is therefore physically prevented
from entering. According to [75], a minimum distance to
delimit the exclusion zone in a 5G deployment is in the order
of 10 [m] from 5G gNBs. Consequently, we have imposed in
Fig. 7 an exclusion zone of 10 [m], which delimits the roof of
the building. As a result, users in Line-of-Sight (LOS) from
the 5G gNB tend to be pretty far from the source of radiation.
By comparing the distance between the exposed users/rats and
the radiating source, we can note that both the NTP study [29],
[30] and the Ramazzini Institute one [31] assume a distance
from the RF source much closer than the minimum distance
from a radiated user in a realistic 5G deployment. This is a
second and essential outcome that obviously differentiates the
laboratory studies w.r.t. the real deployment of 5G gNBs.
In the following step, we compare the test chambers of [29]–
[31] against the real conditions at which a 5G UE operates.
First of all, it is important to remark that a 5G UE is also
used outdoor, and not only in a chamber like in [29]–[31].
In addition, mobility is another important aspect that strongly
impacts the exposure conditions of 5G terminals, which on
the other hand, is not considered by the static deployment
of [29]–[31]. Moreover, the distance between the UE and the
exposed zone of the body is clearly lower than the one imposed
TABLE II
MAXIMUM OUTPUT POWER PMAX FOR THE DIFFERENT DEVICES.
5G Device Value Reference
RF source - NTP 3800 [W] (65 [dBm) [74]
RF source - Ramazzini Institute 100 [W] (50 [dBm]) [31]
5G macro gNB 200 [W] (53 [dBm]) [76]
5G UE 0.2 [W] (23 [dBm]) [77]
in the NTP and Ramazzini Institute studies. Eventually, the
exposure from a UE is not uniform across the environment
like in laboratory studies, but it tends to be localized to the
closest tissues/organs. Therefore, the test conditions adopted in
[29]–[31] are clearly far from the actual operating conditions
of a 5G UE.
Maximum Radiated Power. As a third aspect, we con-
sider the maximum radiated power PMAX of the RF sources
employed in [29]–[31], and their comparison against real 5G
communications equipment (i.e., a 5G macro gNB and a 5G
UE). To this aim, Tab. II reports the comparison across the
different types of devices adopted in the studies and the ones
deployed in 5G networks. Two considerations hold in this case.
First, the value of PMAX adopted in the NTP study is one order
of magnitude higher than the one used in a 5G macro gNB,
and four orders of magnitude higher than the one of a 5G
UE. Although the use of enormous radiated power values is
also recognized by the authors of [29], [30], it is important
to remark that such values are outside the operating range of
realistic 5G gNBs. Second, the value of PMAX used in the
Ramazzini Institute study [31] is comparable with the one of
a 5G macro gNB. However, the maximum radiated power of
the RF source in [31] is still three orders of magnitude higher
than a 5G UE. As a result, we can conclude that none of the
studies [29]–[31] adopt realistic PMAX values for 5G UE, and
only [31] imposes a value of PMAX comparable to the one
radiated by a 5G macro gNB.
Power Management. In this part, we shed light about the
power management adopted by the studies [29]–[31] w.r.t.
realistic 5G gNBs. In general, the power management of a
RF source can be characterized according to two important
aspects: i) how the power is spatially radiated over the service
area, and ii) how the power is varied across time. We denote
i) as spatial power management, while ii) is referred to as
temporal power management. Focusing on the spatial power
management, the goal of [29]–[31] is to keep a uniform
exposure for all the rats inside the room. This is achieved
by adopting radiation patterns of the RF sources that tend
to generate a uniform EMF in the chamber. In addition, the
adoption of a torus structure in [31] and of the stirrers in [29],
[30] allows to achieve this design goal. When comparing these
features against the spatial power management performed by
a 5G macro gNB, several notable differences emerge. As
sketched in Fig. 8(a) a 5G macro gNB does not uniformly
radiate the power over the service area. On the contrary, the
radiated power tends to be focused into beams, which are
directed to the 5G users. Therefore, the different zones of the
service area do not receive the same amount of radiated power.
Also, another important feature implemented in 5G gNBs is
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Fig. 8. Dynamic management of the radiated power for a 5G macro gNB. The
power radiated over the territory varies in space and in time. For example, the
same number of served users results into spatially different radiation patterns,
as shown in (a),(b). The variation in the number of served users (e.g., between
day and night) also impacts the radiation pattern, as shown in (a),(c).
the ability to dynamically vary the power beams in accordance
to the locations of the served users [78]. To this aim, Fig. 8(b)
reports a scenario where the number of served users is the
same as in Fig. 8(a), but with different positioning of the power
beams, which then results in a different radiation pattern over
the service area compared to Fig. 8(a). Consequently, we can
claim that the approaches implemented in in [29]–[31] for the
spatial power management are completely different w.r.t. the
one pursued by a real 5G macro gNB.
Focusing then on the spatial power variations for a UE,
the actual pattern radiated by the RF sources installed on
the terminal depends on their physical positioning in the
terminal, as well as the placement of other nearby elements
such as screen, battery, photo-camera, and RF elements of
other technologies (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth, 2G/3G/4G). We
refer the interested reader to [79] for a detailed overview of
these aspects. In addition, the actual exposure depends on how
the device is held (e.g., horizontally or vertically, with one
hand or with two hands) [79], and thus can not be precisely
known a priori. In any case, however, the design choices tend
to avoid a radiation pattern directed towards the user [79],
which is instead assumed in [29]–[31].
In the following, we concentrate on the temporal power
TABLE III
24H AVERAGE RATIO OF RADIATED POWER δON FOR THE DIFFERENT
DEVICES.
5G Device Value Reference
RF source - NTP 0.38 [29], [30]
RF source - Ramazzini Institute 0.79 [31]
5G macro gNB 0.17 [80]
5G UE 0.17 4 [h] of usage per day [81]
management aspect, by first considering the comparison of
[29]–[31] against a 5G macro gNB. As reported by [29],
[30], the RF source is activated for 18 hours and 10 minutes
per day, by imposing a repetition of an on period always
followed by an off period, each of them lasting for 10 minutes.
Since the goal of the studies [29], [30] is to keep a uniform
exposure, the values of radiated power during the on period
are almost constant.3 Let us denote with δON the ratio of
time over 24 [h] during which the radiated power is on.
Consequently, we can claim that the average ratio of radiated
power computed over the 24h is equal to 38% of the power
radiated during the on periods, i.e., δON = 0.38. Focusing
then on the Ramazzini Institute study [31], the RF source is
continuously activated for 19 [h] over the 24 hours. Therefore,
the 24h average ratio of radiated power is 79% of the power
radiated during the on period, i.e., δON = 0.79. A natural
question is then: Are these values meaningful when compared
to the temporal power variation of a real 5G gNBs? To answer
this question, we consider the realistic values of 24h average
radiated power available for 4G networks, which we assume
to be meaningful also for 5G equipment. As reported by [80],
the 24h average ratio of radiated power from a 4G Node-B
is at maximum equal to 17% when considering the whole set
of Node-Bs deployed in the city of Milan (Italy). Although
this percentage may appear pretty low at first glance, we
remind that different previous works (see, e.g., [82], [83]) have
demonstrated that 4G networks are subject to strong temporal
and spatial traffic variations. For instance, the traffic varies
across the hours of the same day (daytime vs. nighttime), the
day of the week (e.g., weekday vs. weekend), and the location
of the 4G Node-Bs (residential vs. business districts). Since the
amount of traffic managed by a 4G Node-B heavily impacts the
radiated power, it is natural that the 24h average radiated power
(expressed as a fraction of maximum power) is clearly lower
than unity. In line with this trend, 5G is expected to adapt
the radiated power w.r.t the time-varying traffic conditions
wisely. For example, the number of power beams can match
the number of users that need to be served, as graphically
shown in Fig. 8(a)-8(c). Therefore, when the number of users
is low (Fig. 8(c)), the 5G macro gNB can reduce radiated
power. As a result, we can claim that the studies [29]–[31]
adopt a temporal power management very conservative w.r.t.
the one implemented by a 5G macro gNB.
We now focus on the comparison between the temporal
power management in [29]–[31] w.r.t. the one implemented
in 5G UE. First, we point out that the temporal variation of
3As reported by [29], [30], minor oscillations are possible in order to
guarantee a uniform and stable SAR.
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TABLE IV
24H AVERAGE EMF E24H
(s)
MEASURED IN THE NTP STUDY [29], [30] -
GSM TESTS. THE MINIMUM EMF VALUE IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLDFACE.
Target SAR s Frequency f 24h EMF E24h
(s)
1.5 [W/kg] 900 [MHz] 56 [V/m]
3 [W/kg] 900 [MHz] 78 [V/m]
6 [W/kg] 900 [MHz] 111 [V/m]
1.5 [W/kg] 1900 [MHz] 48 [V/m]
3 [W/kg] 1900 [MHz] 68 [V/m]
6 [W/kg] 1900 [MHz] 98 [V/m]
power depends on multiple factors, which include, e.g., the
positioning of the UE w.r.t. the serving gNB as well as the
channel conditions. For example, Non-Line of Sight (NLOS)
conditions and distance from the serving gNB in the order of
hundreds of meters may result in a non-negligible amount of
radiated power by the UE [63]. In this context, we refer the
interested reader to [85] for a detailed overview of the main
communications features affecting the temporal variation of
the RF output power. In addition, the temporal power man-
agement is heavily impacted by the type of applications (e.g.,
instant messaging vs. continuous downloading/uploading of
photos/videos vs. continuous swapping of web pages enriched
with multimedia content vs. notification-oriented applications),
as well as the usage pattern of the user [86]. According to
recent trends (see, e.g., [81]), the average usage of a UE is
currently equal to 3 [h] per day, with a projected increase to
4 [h] in 2021. Even by assuming a worst-case scenario, in
which the UE always transmits at full power during the whole
usage time of 4 [h], the 24h temporal power variation is equal
to 17%, i.e., a value clearly lower than the one imposed in the
laboratory studies [29]–[31].4
ElectroMagnetic Field Exposure Levels. During this step,
we shed light on the values of EMF imposed in [29]–[31],
and their comparison against the estimated exposure from a 5G
macro gNB. Focusing on the NTP studies [29], [30] the values
of exposure are measured by EMF meters that are placed in the
chamber. More in depth, the average value of EMF exposure
during the on period in each chamber and in each experiment is
reported as raw data in the Appendix of the studies [29], [30].
Let us denote this value as EON(c,s), where c is the chamber index
and s is the level of target SAR. Given EON(c,s), we initially
compute the average 24 hours EMF in each chamber and for
each SAR level. We denote this metric as E24h(c,s). Intuitively,
E24h(c,s) allows to obtain a more conservative estimation of the
level of exposure compared to EON(c,s). More formally, we have:
E24h(c,s) = δ
ON · EON(c,s), [V/m] (1)
Clearly, it holds that: E24h(c,s) < E
ON
(c,s). Moreover, we point out
that E24h(c,s) is computed with a linear function of the EMF,
although time-averaged EMFs are commonly evaluated by
applying a root mean square. However, we remark that a linear
4We remind that when a UE is not in use, the radiated power can be larger
than zero due to, e.g., the App notifications and the pushing of multimedia
content. However, the exposure zone tends to be different than the one during
the active usage (e.g., a pocket vs. the front of the head and the chest).
average results into lower values of EMF compared to a root
mean square, and thus allows to consider a very conservative
scenario. In the following, we compute the average 24 hours
EMF across all the chambers, denoted by E24h(s) , again com-
puted for each SAR level s. E24h(s) is formally expressed as:
E24h(s) =
1
|C|
∑
c
E24h(c,s), [V/m] (2)
where |C| is the total number of chambers used in the study.
Similarly to Eq. (1), also E24h(s) is conservatively computed
as a linear average. The final values of E24h(s) are reported in
Tab. IV.5 Interestingly, the 24 hours average EMF ranges be-
tween 48 [V/m] and 111 [V/m], depending on the experiment.
In the following, we focus on the EMF values of the
Ramazzini Institute study [31]. Compared to [29], [30], the
goal of [31] is not to target a certain level of SAR, but rather
a given value of EMF, which is selectively set to 5 [V/m],
25 [V/m] and 50 [V/m]. By considering the daily activation
period of the experiments, which we recall is equal to 19 [h],
we get the following values of 24 hours average EMF: 4 [V/m],
20 [V/m] and 40 [V/m].6
We then focus our attention on the 24 hours average EMF
radiated by a 5G macro gNB. Let us denote with E(d) the EMF
from a 5G macro gNB placed a distance d from the current
position. Clearly, the value of E(d) is influenced by multiple
factors (apart from d), including: the maximum transmission
power of the 5G macro gNB, the presence of transmission
gains/losses in the RF chain, the adopted power management
schemes, the antenna gain and the sight conditions (e.g., LOS
or NLOS). To this aim, Tab. V reports the main steps to com-
pute E(d), by adopting a set of conservative (and worst case)
assumptions and realistic parameters. In brief, the maximum
radiated power PMAX is multiplied by the statistical reduction
factor αSTAT and the time-average reduction factor α24. These
two factors are introduced to take into account the spatial and
temporal power management performed by 5G macro gNB,
and then obtain realistic values of the average radiated power
PAVG. Focusing on αSTAT, we refer the interested reader to
[87] for a closed-form model to compute this parameter. In
addition, recent studies in the literature (see e.g., [80], which
is based on the IEC recommendations [88], [89]) suggest a
value of αSTAT equal to 0.25. In this work, we consider two
distinct values of αSTAT, namely 0.25 and 1. In this way, we
are able to assess the impact of adopting either realistic or
worst case settings. Focusing then on α24, current works (see
e.g., [80]) suggest that the 24h average variation of power
is clearly lower than unity. However, also in this case we
adopt two different values, namely α24 = 0.17 and α24 = 1.0,
to consider both realistic and worst case assumptions. As a
result, PAVG is computed as PMAX ·αSTAT ·α24. In the following
step, we compute the Equivalent Isotropically Radiated Power
(EIRP), by scaling PAVG with the transmission gain and losses
5The table reports the value for the Global System for Mobile Com-
munications (GSM) experiments. Similar values were obtained for the Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) experiments, not reported here for the sake
of simplicity.
6Similarly to Eq. (1), a linear average is computed also here, in order to
obtain a set of conservative values.
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TABLE V
COMPUTATION OF THE EMF LEVEL AT A GIVEN DISTANCE FOR A 5G GNB.
Parameter Notation Value(s)/Formula Comment and Reference
Operating Frequency f 3.7 [GHz] In use in Italy for the mid-band
Maximum Transmission Power PMAX 200 [W] Value from real 5G equipment [76]
Statistical Reduction Factor αSTAT {0.25,1} Value of 0.25 reported by [80].Worst case value equal to 1.
Value of 0.17 for the city of Milan reported by [80].Time-average Reduction Factor α24 {0.17,1} Worst case value equal to 1.
Average Transmission Power PAVG PMAX · αSTAT · α24 Computation done in [80]
Transmission Gain GTX 15 [dB] Gain of a transmitting antenna based on [84]
Transmission Loss LTX 2.32 [dB] Loss reported in [84]
Equivalent Isotropically Radiated Power EIRP PAVG[W]·GTX[linear]
LTX[linear]
Formula based on [84]
Normalized Antenna Numeric Gain GN 1 Worst case based on [84]
Free Space Wave Impedence Z 377 [Ω] Fixed parameter based on [84]
Distance from 5G gNB d 2-100 [m] Varying parameter
Sight Condition - Line of Sight (LoS) Worst case assumption
EMF level at distance d E(d)
√
EIRP ·GN·Z
4·pi·d2 Point source model of [84]
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Fig. 9. EMF (electric field strength) vs. distance for different settings of a
5G macro gNB, based on the models and parameters detailed in Tab. V. The
setting with αSTAT = 1 and α24 = 1 represents the worst-case. The setting
with αSTAT = 0.25 and α24 = 0.17 is based on realistic considerations.
The figure highlights also the positioning of the tests performed by NTP and
Ramazzini Institute and the typical size of an exclusion zone for a 5G macro
gNB (figure best viewed in colors).
reported in Tab. V. Given the EIRP, we apply the point source
model detailed by the ITU in [84] to finally compute E(d). It is
important to remark that, compared to other models (reported
in [84]), the point source represents a worst case, being the
measured level of EMF exposure always lower than the one
computed through this model in the far-field zone.
Fig. 9 reports the values of E(d) vs. the variation of d
and the two values imposed for αSTAT and α24. The figure
also highlights the typical size of the exclusion zone with
a vertical line, which we remind is the minimum distance
between a user and a 5G macro gNB in LOS. In addition, the
horizontal lines mark the maximum 24h average EMF imposed
in the Ramazzini Institute study [31] and the minimum 24h
average EMF measured in the NTP study [29], [30]. We select
the maximum value for [31] because this is the only setting
showing a statistically significant increase of critical diseases
in the rats. On the other hand, we select the minimum EMF
for [29], [30] since some adverse health effects were found
even with this level of exposure.
Several considerations hold by observing Fig. 9. First, E(d)
is rapidly decreasing with d, with values lower than 10 [V/m]
when d > 35 [m]. Second, the introduction of realistic values
for αSTAT and α24 results into an abrupt decrease of E(d),
with an EMF lower than 10 [V/m] already inside the exclusion
zone, and values lower than 5 [V/m] when d > 20 [m]. Third,
the critical values of 24h EMF used in the studies [29]–[31] are
clearly larger than the E(d) values outside the exclusion zone,
even for the worst case αSTAT = 1 and α24 = 1. Fourth, when
adopting realistic settings for αSTAT and α24, E(d) is clearly
lower than the minimum 24h average EMF of [29], [30] and
the maximum 24h average of [31]. As a result, we can claim
that the critical EMF levels used in [29]–[31] to argue the
health impact from RF sources are never reached outside the
exclusion zone of a 5G macro gNB. Therefore, the exposure
levels for the general public are always far below the critical
values of [29]–[31], thus ensuring safety for the population.
Finally, the analysis on the EMF exposure does not include
the comparison against 5G UE. The near-field conditions
at which such devices operate impose to consider the SAR
metric, which is tackled in the next point.
Specific Absorption Rate Levels. We consider here the
comparison of [29]–[31] in terms of realistic SAR values
for 5G UE. To this aim, Tab. VI reports the SAR values
imposed by studies [29]–[31], and their comparison against
the SAR of UE. Due to the limited number of 5G mobile
devices, we include in our analysis also pre-5G UE with
smartphone capabilities (whose data are retrieved from the
publicly available database of [91]). In particular, by adopting
the standardized procedures of [90], [92], two different SAR
values are provided by each manufacturer of UE. The first
one is referred to as a use case where the UE is close to the
head during a call. The second one is instead representative
for a UE worn on the body. The two average values, obtained
over a wide set of UE models, are reported in Tab. VI. On the
other hand, the NTP study [29], [30] adopts three different
values of SAR over the whole animal body, corresponding to
the different exposure levels imposed during the experiments.
Similarly, three different whole-body SAR levels are employed
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TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF SAR VALUES BETWEEN THE ANIMAL-BASED STUDIES [29]–[31] AND THE UE.
Device Value(s)
RF Source - NTP Study [29], [30]
1.5 [W/kg] (whole body of the animal)
3 [W/kg] (whole body of the animal)
6 [W/kg] (whole body of the animal)
0.001 [W/kg] (whole body of the animal)
0.03 [W/kg] (whole body of the animal)RF Source - Ramazzini Institute Study [31]
0.1 [W/kg] (whole body of the animal)
0.68 [W/kg] (local SAR measured by placing the UE
close to the head during a call [90])UE [91] 0.98 [W/kg] (local SAR measured by wearing the
UE on the body [92])
in the Ramazzini Institute study [31].
Different considerations hold by analyzing the outcome of
Tab. VI. First, the SAR values imposed by the NTP study are
consistently higher than those of commercial UE. As a result,
the negative outcomes of [29], [30] can not be generalized
to UE. Second, the SAR values estimated from the Ramazzini
Institute study are consistently lower than those of commercial
devices. Therefore, the outcomes of [31] may be relevant to the
UE in use (which we remind also include legacy technologies).
However, we also point out that the measured SAR of UE is
a local metric (i.e., not referred over the whole body), while
the SAR of the animal-based studies [29], [30] is measured
over the whole mass of the rats/mice. Therefore, the local
and whole-body SAR values can not be directly compared, as
they are referred to different absorption areas and volumes.
We will shed light on this aspect when considering the SAR
regulations in Sec. III. Intuitively, local SAR may be higher
than whole-body SAR. However, it is also important to remark
that the whole-body SAR of the animal-based studies [29],
[30] are referred to rats, whose absorption area and volume are
much lower compared to a human body. Eventually, the actual
SAR levels of UE may differ from the values provided by
manufacturers, since the SAR metric is influenced by multiple
factors, which may introduce strong variations, as pointed out
by ITU [85].
Transmission and Modulation Techniques. In this part,
we focus on the different transmission and modulation tech-
niques implemented in [29]–[31], and their comparison against
the one adopted by real 5G equipment. Focusing on the
NTP study [29], [30], the authors evaluate two different
technologies, namely GSM and CDMA. Focusing on GSM,
this technology leverages Frequency Division Multiple Ac-
cess (FDMA) and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)
techniques. More specifically, the GSM band is divided in
frequency with channels of 200 [kHz]-wide; then, each chan-
nel is temporally divided into eight different time slots that
are used for voice communications. During a voice call of
a UE, a single time slot of a given channel is assigned to
the terminal. The resulting signal shape is therefore clearly
pulsed, as shown, e.g., in Fig. 2 of [29], [30]. Consequently, a
large variation between average and peak power is observed.
It is important to remark, however, that the useful metric
for the evaluation of exposure and/or SAR is the average
power over the sequence of frames and not the instantaneous
one. Eventually, [29], [30] adopted a Gaussian Minimum
Shift Keying (GMSK) modulation scheme, which exploits a
Gaussian filter to shape the digital data. Focusing then on the
experiments based on CDMA, we remind that this techno-
logy employs the Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
transmission scheme, i.e., the information to be transmitted is
firstly multiplied by a random code and then modulated on the
carrier. Differently from GSM, each transmission employs the
whole frequency band to transfer the information. In this case,
a fundamental feature is the control of the emitted power, e.g.,
a UE should always transmit at minimum power to reduce the
interference to the other terminals in the same cell. In addition,
the adopted modulation scheme is Quadrature Phase Shift
Keying (QPSK), which employs a phase change solution. The
resulting implemented CDMA standard is Interim Standard 95
(IS-95).
Focusing then on the test conditions of [29], [30], the signals
imposed in the experiments are generated by a signal genera-
tor, with different uplink configurations, namely: one slot per
frame active for GSM chambers, and the IS-95 standard uplink
signal generator settings for CDMA chambers.7
In the following, we move our attention to the Ramazzini
Institute study [31]. In line with [29], [30], also this work
adopts FDMA and TDMA techniques, in combination with
the GMSK modulation scheme. More in-depth, the authors of
[31] state that a complete-time slot assignment and the call
operating mode are exploited. Although the number of used
slots is not explicitly reported, it is natural to assume that one
slot per frame is active also in the study.
Lastly, we analyze the main features in terms of trans-
mission and modulation techniques implemented in the 5G
New Radio (5G-NR). Unless otherwise specified, we adopt
the 3GPP release 16 specifications, whose working documents
are publicly available in [93]. In order to support the variegate
services offered by 5G, the features implemented in the
physical layer are very flexible and highly customizable to
the working conditions. More in-depth, the multiple access
is realized with Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplex-
ing (OFDM) with Cyclic Prefix (CP) in the downlink, and
Discrete Fourier Transform-spread-Orthogonal Frequency Di-
vision Multiplexing (DFT-s-OFDM) or OFDM with CP in
the uplink. These techniques are the evolution of OFDM,
which employs orthogonal subcarrier signals to transmit data
information in parallel. Also, another great difference between
7This information is available in [74].
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TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF THE MAIN COMMUNICATIONS FEATURES THAT ARE COLLECTED BY THE POPULATION-BASED STUDIES [27], [68]–[72] W.R.T THE
ONES THAT ARE MEANINGFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF 5G.
Feature Population-Based Study 5G Communications
Evaluation Questionnaire, Personal Interviews, Remote Interview,Mobile-operator Log Cloud-based App, Mobile-operator Log
Evaluation Frequency One shot, periodic Continuous
Activity Type Call Call, Streaming Video, Social Media, Instant Messaging
Activity Intensity Number of calls Number of minutes spent for each App, Amount of contentuploaded/Downloaded
Connectivity Phone Number, Operator Phone Number, Operator, Used Interfaces, Used Frequencies,Handover Information
UE position Distance from head, Use of hands free devices User Proximity, UE handling grasp
User location Country, Residence Country, Residence, Mobility Patterns
UE Information Device Model Device Model
5G and legacy generations (like the one used in [29]–[31]) is
the ability of employing a flexible (i.e., not fixed) subcarrier
spacing. Eventually, 5G integrates the possibility of adopting
different modulation techniques, which include Binary Phase
Shift Keying (BPSK), QPSK, and Quadrature Amplitude Mod-
ulation (QAM).
In conclusion, the transmission and modulation techniques
adopted in [29]–[31] are representative for legacy devices,
which assume voice as the only service provided by the mobile
network. On the other hand, the transmission and modulation
techniques adopted in 5G devices are radically different, to
cope with the great level of flexibility that this technology
guarantees w.r.t. GSM or CDMA. This level of flexibility
is clearly neglected by [29]–[31], thus posing limits on the
applicability of their outcomes in the 5G context.
Summary. We have reviewed the works [29]–[31] under
the perspective of 5G communications perspective. Many
settings and/or assumptions imposed in [29]–[31] appear to be
completely different and/or far from reality when compared to
those ones adopted in 5G equipment. Such differences include:
• very short distances compared to the real ones from a 5G
macro gNB;
• large amount of radiated power and almost absence of
power management techniques;
• very long exposure times;
• very high EMF levels - much larger the ones radiated by
a 5G macro gNB;
• whole-body SAR levels not directly comparable to local
SAR in real smartphones;
• basic transmission and modulation schemes.
Therefore, it is not possible to claim that the health effects
observed in [29]–[31] may appear in a real 5G deployment.
To this aim, ICNIRP pointed out in a specific note [94] that
the studies [29]–[31] do not provide a consistent, reliable
and generalizable body of evidence for revising the exposure
guidelines. Further studies, tailored to address the limitations
of [29]–[31], are therefore needed.
2) Population-based Studies: We then review the
population-based studies [27], [68]–[72] from the perspective
of the 5G communications engineering. To this aim, Tab. VII
compares the main communications features adopted in
previous studies and how such metrics have to be (eventually)
changed or enriched when considering 5G equipment.
First of all, the evaluation in [27], [68]–[72] is done by ap-
plying traditional ways, e.g., questionnaires, personal/remote
interviews, and (in few cases) analysis of the log files made
available by network operators. Due to the variegate set of
5G services, which include the exchange of data and voice
communications, it is not possible to rely upon questionnaires
and/or interviews to measure the UE activity. On the contrary,
this information can be easily retrieved by running custom
applications on the UE, which automatically transfer the
measured data on a controlled cloud. Eventually, when this
approach can not be pursued (e.g., due to privacy issues), log
files made available by the mobile operators should be used.
Focusing on the evaluation frequency, the population-based
studies [27], [68]–[72] assume that the information about UE
activity is retrieved with a small pace, i.e., either at the end
of the considered period or on a periodic base. In contrast
to them, 5G imposes continuous monitoring of UE activities,
due to the highly temporal variation of the amount of data
exchanged by the applications installed on the smartphone
with the 5G services.
As a third aspect, the primary goal of the population-based
studies is to monitor the duration of the calls. Although 5G
still provides voice services, for which the call duration should
be monitored, it is also important to report the time spent over
each service type, which may include, e.g., streaming video,
social media, and instant messaging. This step is fundamental
to build a precise user profile, with exposure information
for each service type. Besides, previous studies adopted the
number of calls as an indicator of the intensity of UE activity.
In the context of 5G, it is fundamental to track the amount of
time spent in each application, as well as the amount of data
uploaded/downloaded, to derive specific information tailored
to the user and the adopted application(s).
Focusing on the connectivity, the population-based studies
mainly measure basic features such as the subscriber mobile
phone number and the mobile operator. In the context of
5G, this information has to be enriched by including the
temporal usage of each interface(s) (e.g., 5G, 4G, WiFi). In
addition, another important information includes the adopted
frequencies (e.g., sub GHz, mid-band, mm-Waves), as well
as the indication about the performed handovers (which can
affect the exposure patterns).
Focusing then on the UE position, the population-based
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studies [27], [68]–[72] adopt simple metrics, like the distance
from the head and the use of hands free devices. When
considering 5G, it is essential to retrieve the proximity of
the UE w.r.t the user, which can be from head/chest or other
parts of the body. Besides, since the UE is used in different
ways (e.g., talking, watching a video, texting, self-recording,
environment recording), it is also fundamental to measure the
UE handling grasp (e.g., one hand, two hands, vertical handle,
horizontal handle). Eventually, the user location (in terms of
country and residence) is used by population-based studies,
e.g., to classify the users w.r.t. the living areas (e.g., urban,
rural). In the context of 5G, user mobility is key information
that should be also recorded.
Finally, population-based studies store the device model as
UE information. Since the UE exposure varies across the
different models, this information should be also recorded
when considering 5G equipment.
Summarizing, although large efforts have been done by
previous population-based studies [27], [68]–[72] to assess
the exposure from UE in legacy generation networks, their
findings can not be entirely generalized also to 5G UE.
Therefore, a new set of population-based studies, explicitly
focused on 5G, should be put into place. This step would
require to radically change the measurement techniques, the
parameters that need to be measured, and the methodology
to share the data. However, we point out all these steps are
completely feasible from a technological point of view, even
when considering currently available devices.
III. 5G EXPOSURE: METRICS, REGULATIONS AND
COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENTS
A key aspect to quantify the health risks associated with
5G is the formal characterization of 5G exposure and its
analysis from a regulation point of view. To face this point, we
focus on the following aspects: ii) characterization of the main
exposure metrics for 5G UE and 5G gNB, ii) analysis of the
international regulations defining limits on 5G exposure, iii)
analysis of the impact of national regulations on the health
risks, iv) overview of the policies to assess the exposure
compliance of 5G equipment w.r.t the limits.
A. 5G Exposure Metrics
The main metrics that are used to characterize 5G exposure
are: i) EMF strength, ii) power density, iii) SAR value. In the
following, we provide a concise definition of each metric. We
refer the interested reader to [22] and references therein to
obtain more details about exposure metrics for RF sources.
1) Electromagnetic Field Strength: Each RF source gene-
rates an EMF that is spread over the environment. The field
is composed of an electric component and a magnetic one.
Let us denote the electric field as E, with a measurement unit
in terms of Volt per meter [V/m]. Similarly, let us denote the
magnetic field asH , with a measurement unit in terms of Tesla
[T]. In general, both E and H are time-averaged values, i.e.,
they are estimated over a sufficiently long-time-interval (e.g.,
in the order of minutes [22]). Under far-field conditions, the
EMF is characterized by solely analyzing E. Otherwise, when
the EMF is evaluated under near-field conditions, both H and
E are needed to fully characterize the EMF strength.
Apart from time-averaged values, the EMF can be computed
as an average from different points in the space. For example,
the spatially averaged electric field strength Eavg over volume
V is computed by applying a root mean square operation.
More formally, we have:
Eavg =
√
1
V
ˆ
V
|E|2dv [V/m]. (3)
2) Power Density: A second metric used to assess the level
of exposure is the power density (PD), which can be either the
absorbed power density Sab or the incident power density Sinc.
More formally, the absorbed power density Sab is expressed
as:
Sab =
¨
A
1
A
Re[E ×H∗] ds, [W/m2], (4)
where the body surface is at position 0 [cm], A [cm2] is the x-
y integral area, E is the electric field, H is the magnetic field,
ds is the integral variable vector whose direction is orthogonal
w.r.t. A, while Re(·) and (·)∗ denote the real part and the
complex conjugate, respectively.
The incident power density Sinc is defined as the modulus of
the complex Poynting vector. More formally, Sinc is expressed
as:
Sinc = |E ×H∗|, [W/m2]. (5)
Under far-field conditions or transverse electromagnetic
plane wave, Eq. (5) is simplified as:
Sinc =
|E|2
Z
= |H|2×Z, [W/m2]′ (6)
where Z = 377 [Ω] is the characteristic impedance of the
free space. It is important to remark that Eq. (6) is also used
when evaluating the equivalent power density metric (which
is commonly denoted as Seq).
Finally, the absorbed power density is related to the incident
power density through the following equation:
Sab =
(
1− |Γ|2)× Sinc, [W/m2], (7)
where Γ is a reflection coefficient, which depends on multiple
physical features. We refer the interested reader to [22] for a
more detailed overview of such properties.
In general, the international regulations define PD limits
that are expressed in terms of maximum Sinc values, since the
incident power density is easier to be measured compared to
the absorbed power density Sab.
3) Specific Absorption Rate: According to [22], SAR is
the time derivative of the energy consumed by heating that
is absorbed by a mass, included in a volume of a given mass
density. When considering biological tissues and/or organs, the
SAR is expressed as:
SAR =
σ
ρ
|E|2, [W/kg] (8)
where σ [S/m] is the electrical conductivity, ρ [kg/m3] is the
density of the tissue/organ, and E [V/m] is the internal electric
field.
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Under not significant heat loss processes [22], it is possible
to express the SAR by considering the temperature rise. More
formally, we have:
SAR = c
∆T
∆t
, (9)
where c [J/(kg · Celsius)] is the tissue specific heat, ∆T [Cel-
sius] is the temperature rise, and ∆t [s] is the exposure
duration.
In general, limits considering SAR as exposure metric
assume two distinct spatially-averaged values, namely whole
body SAR and local SAR. The whole body SAR takes into
account the body mass and the total energy absorbed by the
body. On the other hand, the local SAR assumes a given
(small) volume with a given (small) mass.
Measuring the SAR becomes challenging for assessing the
compliance of the exposure w.r.t. the regulations for high
frequencies (like the mm-Waves ones). When the frequency
increases, the penetration depth of the wave decreases. Under
such a condition, the temperature rise is more superficial, and
the heat tends to be lost across the environment, as pointed
out by [22]. On the other hand, it is feasible to measure
the PD instead of the SAR for high frequencies. In general,
the majority of the regulatory standards assign a frequency
threshold, denoted as fth, after which the considered limits
switch from SAR to PD. However, some regulations (like [22])
additionally include SAR limits also for frequencies larger
than fth, in order to apply a conservative assumption. In any
case, all the regulations differentiate between whole body SAR
and local SAR (e.g., head, chest).
B. International Regulations on 5G EMF Exposure
The main international organizations defining regulations on
RF exposure are ICNIRP, IEEE and FCC. Both ICNIRP and
IEEE revised the regulations throughout the years. More in-
depth, ICNIRP defined the EMF guidelines in 1998 [95], and
then revised them in 2020 [22]. In a similar way, IEEE defined
RF safety guidelines in the C95.1 standard, which was updated
in 2005 [96], and then updated again in 2019 [97]. Finally, the
FCC released the RF guidelines in Bulletin 65 [98], which,
to the best of our knowledge, are still in force since their
release, dated back to 1997. The reason for reporting various
regulations of each organization is twofold. On one side, it
is possible to track changes over the different regulations and
check whether the different regulations are converging into
a common set of limit values. On the other hand, different
countries in the world adopt different regulations [100]. For
example, the ICNIRP 1998 guidelines [95] are still in force in
many countries, with plans to gradually switch to the ICNIRP
2020 guidelines [22] in the forthcoming years.
In general, the EMF regulations consider two distinct sets
of limits for human exposure, namely general public limits
and occupational limits. The first set is tailored to the general
public, who may be not aware of being exposed to radiation
(e.g., EMF from gNB). On the other hand, occupational limits
are defined for workers subject to RF exposure in a controlled
environment, and therefore may take some precautionary pro-
cedures to reduce the exposure. A typical example of this
second set is a technician performing a maintenance operation
on a cellular tower under operation. The general public limits
are, in general, more stringent than the occupational ones. In
the following, we discuss the international limits in terms of
PD, EMF strength, and SAR, under the 5G communications
perspective.
1) PD Limits: We initially analyze the PD limits, shown in
Tab. VIII. Several considerations hold by exploring the table
values. First, a huge variability in terms of limits emerges,
even by considering different versions of the same organization
(e.g., ICNIRP or IEEE). Second, PD limits notably change
across the frequencies, being some limits fixed for a given
range of frequencies, and other ones varying with the adopted
frequency. Third, the values of occupational limits are, in gen-
eral, higher than the general public ones (as expected). Fourth,
when going towards mm-Wave frequencies, most of the limits
employ fixed values (i.e., not varying with frequency). Fifth,
the latest versions of ICNIRP and IEEE adopt a common set
of limits when the PD over the whole body is considered.
Sixth, both the ICNIRP 1998 [95] and the FCC guidelines
[98] enforce SAR limits (which are going to be detailed later
on) for frequencies below the threshold when considering
local exposure. Finally, PD limits for the local exposure are
extensively defined for all 5G frequencies in the ICNIRP 2020
[22] and IEEE C95.1 guidelines [97].
2) EMF Strength Limits: We then move our attention to the
limits on the EMF strength, which are reported in Tab. IX.
In general, these limits are enforced when considering the
EMF from gNB. Interestingly, the latest versions of the limits
define two working regions. In the first one, which is typically
below 300 [MHz] of frequency, the limits are expressed in
terms of maximum incident E field, with values very close
among the different regulations. On the other hand, for very
high frequencies (i.e., in the order of dozens of GHz), the
limits are defined in terms of PD. For intermediate frequencies,
ICNIRP 2020 [22] considers the maximum EMF strength up to
2 [GHz], then PD is taken into account for higher frequencies.
Note that many countries in the world (see, e.g., the network
limit map of [100]) still adopt the ICNIRP 1998 limits [95],
which are instead defined in terms of the maximum incident
electric strength for all the frequencies up to 300 [GHz].
Similarly to the PD case, general public limits are much more
conservative than occupational ones (as expected). Finally, the
table reports the minimum amount of time needed to measure
the incident electric field. Interestingly, the last versions of
ICNIRP [22] and IEEE C95.1 [97] guidelines converge to
a 30 [min] of time duration for both general public and
occupational. On the other hand, the previous version of IEEE
C95.1 [96], as well as the FCC guidelines [98], adopt a 6 [min]
time duration when considering occupational exposure.
3) SAR Limits: In the final part of this step, we consider the
SAR limits, which are reported in Tab. X. We initially focus on
the SAR to PD switching frequency fth. In the context of 5G,
fth will differentiate between limits (and metrics) applied to
mm-Waves w.r.t. the mid-band and the sub-GHz frequencies
used by this technology. Interestingly, the values of fth are
not the same across the regulations. For example, the ICNIRP
2020 guidelines [22] do not impose any frequency threshold
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TABLE VIII
PD LIMITS FOR FREQUENCIES f UP TO 300 [GHZ].
ICNIRP IEEE C95.1
PD Metric
1998 [95] 2020 [22] 2005 [96] 2019 [97]
FCC-1997 [98]
2 [W/m2], 30 < f ≤ 400 [MHz] 2 [W/m
2], 30 < f ≤
300 [MHz]
f /200 [W/m2], 400 < f ≤ 2000 [MHz] f /150 [Wm/
2], 300 <
f ≤ 1500 [MHz]
10 [W/m2], 2 < f <
100 [GHz] 10 [W/m
2], 10 [W/m2],
G
en
.P
ub
lic
10 [W/m2], 2 < f < 300 [GHz]
(90 ·f−7000) [W/m2],
100 < f < 300 [GHz] 2 < f < 300 [GHz] 1.5 < f < 100 [GHz]
10 [W/m2], 30 < f ≤ 400 [MHz] 10 [W/m
2], 30 < f ≤
300 [MHz]
10 [W/m2], 30 < f ≤
400 [MHz]
10 [W/m2], 30 < f ≤
300 [MHz]
f /40 [W/m2], 400 < f ≤ 2000 [MHz] f /30 [W/m
2], 300 <
f ≤ 3000 [MHz]
f /40 [W/m2], 400 <
f ≤ 2000 [MHz]
f /30 [Wm/2], 300 <
f ≤ 1500 [MHz]
W
ho
le
B
od
y
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l
50 [W/m2], 2 < f < 300 [GHz] 100 [W/m
2], 3 < f <
300 [GHz]
50 [W/m2], 2 < f <
300 [GHz]
50 [W/m2], 1.5 < f <
100 [GHz]
SAR Limits,
f < 10 [GHz]
0.058 · f0.86 [W/m2],
400 < f ≤
2000 [MHz]
40 [W/m2], 400 < f ≤
3000 [MHz]
1.19 · f0.463 [W/m2],
100 < f <
2000 [MHz]
SAR Limits,
f < 6 [GHz]
10 [W/m2], 10 < f <
300 [GHz]
40 [W/m2], 2 < f ≤
6 [GHz]
18.56 ·f0.699, 3 < f ≤
30 [GHz]
40 [W/m2], 2 < f <
6 [GHz]
10 [W/m2], 6 < f <
100 [GHz]G
en
.P
ub
lic
55/f0.177 [W/m2], 6 <
f ≤ 300 [GHz]
200 [W/m2, 30 < f ≤
300 [GHz]
55/f0.177 [W/m2], 6 <
f < 300 [GHz]
SAR Limits,
f < 10 [GHz]
0.29 · f0.86 [W/m2],
400 < f ≤
2000 [MHz]
200 [W/m2], 300 <
f ≤ 3000 [MHz]
5.93 · f0.463 [W/m2],
100 < f <
2000 [MHz]
SAR Limits,
f < 6 [GHz]
50 [W/m2], 10 < f <
300 [GHz]
100 [W/m2], 2 < f ≤
6 [GHz]
200 · (f/3)1/5, 3 <
f ≤ 96 [GHz]
200 [W/m2], 2 < f <
6 [GHz]
50 [W/m2], 6 < f <
100 [GHz]
L
oc
al
iz
ed
E
xp
os
ur
e
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l
275/f0.177 [W/m2],
6 < f ≤ 300 [GHz]
400 [W/m2], 96 < f ≤
300 [GHz]
274.8/f0.177 [W/m2],
6 < f < 300 [GHz]
TABLE IX
EMF STRENGTH (INCIDENT E FIELD) LIMITS FOR FREQUENCIES f UP TO 300 [GHZ].
ICNIRP IEEE C95.1
Metric
1998 [95] 2020 [22] 2005 [96] 2019 [97]
FCC-1997 [98]
28 [V/m], 10 < f ≤
400 [MHz]
27.7 [V/m], 30 < f ≤
400 [MHz]
27.5 [V/m], 30 < f ≤ 400 [MHz] 27.5 [V/m], 30 < f ≤
300 [MHz]
1.375 · f0.5 [V/m], 400 < f ≤ 2000 [MHz] Power density limits, Power density limits,
G
en
er
al
Pu
bl
ic
61 [V/m], 2 < f <
300 [GHz]
Power density limits, 2 <
f < 300 [GHz]
f > 400 [MHz] f > 300 [MHz]
61 [V/m], 10 < f ≤
400 [MHz]
61 [V/m], 30 < f ≤
400 [MHz]
61.4 [V/m], 30 < f ≤ 400 [MHz] 61.4 [V/m], 30 < f ≤
300 [MHz]
3 · f0.5 [V/m], 400 < f ≤ 2000 [MHz] Power density limits, Power density limits,
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l
137 [V/m], 2 < f <
300 [GHz]
Power density limits, 2 <
f < 300 [GHz]
f > 400 [MHz] f > 300 [MHz]
6 [min], f ≤ 10 [GHz] 30 [min] (General Public) 30 [min] (General Public)
Ti
m
e
68/f1.05 [min], f >
10 [GHz] (f in GHz)
30 [min]
6 [min] (Occupational)
30 [min]
6 [min] (Occupational)
on the whole body exposure, and thus SAR-based limits are
assumed over the whole range of 5G frequencies. However,
a threshold fth = 6 [GHz] is imposed for the local exposure,
and this setting is in common with the FCC 1997 [98] and the
IEEE C95.1 2019 [97] guidelines. Moreover, many countries
in the world currently adopt the ICNIRP 1998 [95] and FCC
1997 [98] regulations, which enforce fth = 10 [GHz] and
fth = 6 [GHz], respectively. In this case, PD-based limits will
be enforced for mm-Wave frequencies.
Focusing then on the whole body SAR limits, we can note
that the same values are used across the different regulations.
In addition, both ICNIRP 2020 [22] and IEEE C95.1 2019
[97] adopt the same value of averaging time (i.e., 30 [min]).
Eventually, the averaging time for SAR is not defined in the
FCC guidelines.8 In particular, this regulation refers to the
IEEE C95.1 1991 standard [99] for the averaging time values.
Specifically, when considering occupational exposure, an av-
eraging time equal to 6 [min] is assumed. When considering
instead general public exposure, multiple times (reported in
Table 2 of [99]) are defined, ranging however between 6 [min]
8The FCC 1997 guidelines [98] define averaging time only for the PD
and EMF strength.
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TABLE X
SAR LIMITS (INCLUDING DOSE METRICS) FOR FREQUENCIES f UP TO 300 [GHZ].
ICNIRP IEEE C95.1
Metric
1998 [95] 2020 [22] 2005 [96] 2019 [97]
FCC-1997 [98]
None (Whole Body)
SAR to PD Switching Frequency fth 10 [GHz] 6 [GHz] (Local)
3 [GHz] 6 [GHz]
General Public 0.08 [W/kg]
Occupational 0.4 [W/kg]
Averaging Time 6 [min] 30 [min] 6 [min] 30 [min] Defined in [99]
Dose Metric for f ≤ fth SAR
W
ho
le
B
od
y
Dose Metric for f > fth incident PD Sinc SAR incident PD Sinc
plane-wave
equivalent PD
Seq
plane-wave
equivalent PD
Seq
General Public 2 [W/kg] 1.6 [W/kg]
Occupational 10 [W/kg] 8 [W/kg]
Averaging Time 6 [min] Defined in [99]
Averaging Mass 10 [g] 1 [g]
Averaging Shape Not defined cubic
Dose Metric for f ≤ fth SAR
L
oc
al
iz
ed
E
xp
os
ur
e
Dose Metric for f > fth incident Sinc absorbed PD Sab incident PD Sinc epithelial PD
plane-wave
equivalent PD
Seq
and 30 [min] for the adopted SAR frequencies.
We then move our attention on the dose metrics for
the whole body exposure. Clearly, SAR is always used for
frequencies f ≤ fth. When considering instead f > fth,
different metrics are used (e.g., incident PD, SAR, plane-
wave equivalent PD). However, it is important to remark that
the ICNIRP 2020 guidelines [22] conservatively enforce SAR
limits even for f > fth.
In the following, we consider the SAR limits for local
exposure, reported on bottom of Tab. X. In this case, ICNIRP
and IEEE differentiate from FCC in terms of: limits, averag-
ing time, and averaging mass. However, the latest versions
of the regulations agree on a cubic mass, thus adopting a
uniform metric. Focusing then on the dose metrics, the same
consideration of the whole body exposure hold for f ≤ fth.
When considering f > fth, all the regulations adopt PD-based
metrics. However, it is important to remark that the adopted PD
metrics are not the same across the regulations. For example,
the ICNIRP 1998 guidelines [95] adopt the incident PD, while
the IEEE C95.1 2019 regulations [97] employ the ephitelial
PD (i.e., the power flow through the epithelium per unit area
directly under the body surface). In this case, it is important to
remark that custom PD limits (different from the ones reported
in Tab. VIII) are defined for the ephitelial PD, i.e., 20 [W/m2]
for 6 < f < 300 [GHz] (general public) and 100 [W/m2] for
6 < f < 300 [GHz] (occupational).
4) Summary: We have considered international regulations
that define exposure limits in terms of PD, EMF strength,
and SAR. Although some efforts in making uniform rules
across the different organizations obviously emerge, we can
claim that 5G devices will be subject to different limits,
due to the different frequencies at which they operate, as
well as to the different thresholds and metrics used in the
compliance assessment. This jeopardization tends to increase
the health risks that are perceived by the population, since a
lack of common limits and/or metrics may be (improperly)
associated to a lack of a universal view among the different
guidelines. Moreover, several countries in the world adopt
more stringent exposure limits than the international ones,
on the basis of precautionary principles. This issue, which
notably complicates the health risks perception and the 5G
deployment, is analyzed in detail in the following subsection.
C. Impact of National Regulations
We provide a comprehensive review of the national EMF
exposure regulations and their impact on 5G deployment. We
divide our research under the following avenues: i) overview
of national exposure regulations stricter than the ICNIRP 1998
[95] and/or FCC 1997 [98] guidelines9 (henceforth simply
referred as ICNIRP and FCC, respectively), ii) impact of
national regulations on 5G gNB deployment, iii) impact of
national regulations on 5G UE adoption, iv) population-based
analysis, and v) geographical analysis.
1) Overview of National Exposure Regulations Stricter than
ICNIRP/FCC Guidelines: We preliminary perform an in-depth
search of the exposure regulations in each country in the world.
Our primary sources are the data made available by Global
System for Mobile communications Association (GSMA) in
[100], [101] and by WHO in [102], the work of Madjar
[103], the report of Stam [104], the information retrieved from
national EMF regulation authorities [105]–[108], and other
relevant documents [109]–[117].
We initially focus on the national EMF regulations for gNB
exposure. As a consequence, we focus on EMF strength with
9We adopt the EMF limits defined in ICNIRP 1998 [95] and FCC 1997
[98] guidelines, as these regulations are currently still in force in many
countries in the world. To the best of our knowledge, the adoption of the
ICNIRP 2020 guidelines [95] by the national governments is an ongoing
process, not yet completed at the time of preparing this work.
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Fig. 10. Maximum 5G gNB limits on the field strength in residential areas
for the countries adopting EMF regulations stricter than ICNIRP 1998 [95]
and FCC 1997 [98] guidelines (frequency under consideration: 26 [GHz]).
far field conditions. When a national regulation expresses the
limit in terms of PD, we employ Eq. (6) to compute the EMF
strength. In this way, we obtain a set of homogeneous limits.
Fig. 10 reports a graphical overview of the maximum
EMF limits in countries imposing strict regulations for gNB
exposure, and their positioning w.r.t. the EMF strength limits
of the ICNIRP/FCC guidelines.10 In this case, we report the
limits by considering a 5G frequency equal 26 [GHz]11 for
multiple reasons, namely: i) this frequency is representative
of the mm-Wave band in 5G, which triggers the highest
exposure concerns from the population, ii) frequencies in the
mid-band and sub-GHz bands are in general varying across
the different countries (especially in the sub-GHz band); as a
result, the EMF limit considerably changes w.r.t. the adopted
frequency, making the comparison of the limits across the
different countries a challenging task, iii) although not all
countries in the world adopt the 26 [GHz] frequency in the
mm-Wave band, the enforced limit does not generally vary
across other frequencies in the mm-Wave band.
Several considerations hold by analyzing Fig. 10 in de-
tail. First, a huge variability across the national limits ap-
parently emerges. Second, when enforcing a limit stricter
than ICNIRP/FCC, the reduction factor is considerably large,
10For the sake of simplicity, ICNIRP and FCC limits are collapsed in a
single line.
11The EMF limits in Canada are stricter than ICNIRP 1998 [95] and FCC
1997 [98] guidelines only for 5G frequencies lower than 6 [GHz] [103]. When
considering mm-Waves, like in this case, the EMF limits enforced in Canada
correspond to the ICNIRP 1998 [95] and FCC 1997 [98] ones. However, we
report Canada in the figure for completeness.
i.e., more than 10 times for the majority of the countries
adopting strict limits. This reduction factor heavily impacts
the installation of 5G gNBs in residential areas, as a strict
EMF limit may be easily saturated in the presence of multiple
operators and/or multiple technologies (e.g., 2G/3G/4G/5G)
operating over the territory [12], [118]. Third, the perception
of health risks connected to 5G gNB in countries with strict
EMF limits may be higher compared to the ones enforcing
ICNIRP/FCC limits, due to the fact that the measured EMF
levels may be close to the limits.
We then move our attention on the national UE exposure
regulations that are stricter than ICNIRP 1998 [95] and FCC
1997 [98] guidelines. Interestingly, the only countries in the
world falling in this category are Belarus and Armenia, which
still adopt regulations based on legacy Soviet Union limits,
expressed in terms of maximum PD of 100 [QW/cm2] at
an unknown distance. On the other hand, most of the other
countries adopt ICNIRP/FCC limits, typically expressed in
terms of SAR. Therefore, we can conclude that the perception
of health risks connected to the adoption of 5G UE is typically
lower than the gNB case.
2) Impact of National Regulations on 5G gNB Deployment:
In the following, we jointly consider the impact of different
EMF strength limits with the deployment of 5G gNBs in
each country of the world. Specifically, we initially retrieve
the information about 5G deployment in each country in the
world, by considering nations that have already auctioned
the 5G frequencies or have clear plans of forthcoming 5G
auctions. Our primary sources are the GSMA documents about
5G spectrum management [119], [120], the European 5G
Observatory [121] and other relevant (and up-to-date) national
references [109], [111], [122]–[138].
We then consider the following taxonomy for the EMF
limits: L1) stricter than ICNIRP/FCC, L2) ICNIRP-based,
L3) FCC-based, or L4) unknown. Clearly, the deployment of
the 5G gNBs will be a challenging step in countries with
strict EMF limits (L1), a possible step in countries adopting
ICNIRP/FCC limits (L2,L3), and an unknown step in countries
without a regulation on the limits (L4).
Focusing then on the frequencies used by 5G gNBs, we
consider the taxonomy in terms of 5G frequency bands that
have been auctioned/planned in the country, and namely: F1)
below 1 [GHz], F2) between 1 [Ghz] and 6 [Ghz], F3) above
6 [Ghz], F4) none. Each frequency in F1)-F3) has a different
5G performance target. The sub-GHz frequencies in F1) will
be used to provide coverage, the mm-Wave frequencies in F3)
will be exploited to guarantee capacity, while the mid band
frequencies in F2) will provide a mixture of coverage and
capacity. It is important to note that F1)-F3) are not exclusive,
i.e., a country may exploit 5G frequencies of any combination
of F1), F2), F3). For example, Italy will deploy 5G networks
over frequencies in F1)-F3), while 5G frequencies in F1) and
F2) are exploited in Saudi Arabia. Finally, a country is listed in
F4) if the frequency plans for 5G have not been (yet) defined.
Fig. 11(a) reports the matrix of the possible combinations
between adopted EMF strength limits (strict, ICNIRP, FCC,
none) and planned/auctioned 5G frequencies (below 1 [GHz],
between 1 [Ghz] and 6 [Ghz], above 6 [Ghz], none). Each cell
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Fig. 11. EMF-limits / 5G frequencies matrices. Each cell in the matrix includes the group ID and the number of countries belonging to the group. The cell
color is proportional to the number of countries belonging to the group, from white (zero weight) to red (weight equal to 88).
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Fig. 12. EMF-limits / 5G frequencies matrices. Each cell in the matrix includes the group ID and the weight based on the population of each country
belonging to the group. The cell color is proportional to the cell weight, from white (zero weight) to red (weight equal to 39).
in the matrix is identified by a group ID (between 1 and 16).
Each cell’s color is proportional to the number of countries
belonging to the group (from white to red), whose value is
also reported in the cell. Moreover, we stress the fact that
each country may be repeated across the following frequency
options: below 1 [GHz], between 1 [Ghz] and 6 [Ghz],
and above 6 [Ghz] (depending on the auctioned/planned 5G
frequencies).
Several considerations hold by analyzing in more detail
Fig. 11(a). First, as clearly shown by the intense red color
of group 8, the majority of the countries adopt ICNIRP
limits without any plan (so far) to deploy the 5G technology.
Second, when observing the countries deploying 5G gNBs
with ICNIRP limits (group 6), a typical setting is to target
a mixture of coverage and capacity. Third, the highest health
risks will be perceived in groups 1-3, i.e., the countries where
5G gNBs will be deployed under strict EMF constraints.
Interestingly, the cardinality of groups 1-3 is not negligible.
Fourth, the number of countries with unknown limits and
without any 5G gNB implementation is also relevant (i.e.,
group 16). The population of these countries will perceive
high health risks in case of future deployment of 5G networks.
However, we also stress the fact that operators generally apply
ICNIRP/FCC limits on a volunteer basis in countries without
EMF limits.
In a nutshell, a considerable jeopardization emerges when
the different EMF limits and the deployment of 5G gNBs
are jointly considered. This jeopardization will also affect
the perceived health risks associated with 5G in different
countries.
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Fig. 13. World map with countries colored according to the EMF limits on field strength (strict, ICNIRP/FCC, unknown) and gNB deployment (5G, no 5G)
- Most of micro states are omitted (Figure best viewed in colors).
3) Impact of National Regulations on 5G UE Adoption: We
then move our attention to the impact of national regulations
on the adoption of 5G UE. Similarly to the 5G gNB case,
we consider the following taxonomy for the EMF limits: L1)
stricter than ICNIRP, L2) ICNIRP-based, L3) FCC-based, or
L4) unknown. Differently from 5G gNBs, in this case, we
focus on the limits for UE expressed in terms of SAR and/or
PD. In line with the 5G gNB analysis, we consider the same
taxonomy (and same references) for the planned/auctioned
5G frequencies already used before, and namely: F1) below
1 [GHz], F2) between 1 [Ghz] and 6 [Ghz], F3) above 6 [Ghz],
or F4) none. Fig. 11(b) details the obtained matrix, with colors
from white to red highlighting the number of countries falling
in each group. By observing in more detail the figure, we can
note that the group with the highest cardinality is composed
of countries enforcing ICNIRP limits for the UE and no plans
to adopt 5G devices (group 8). Moreover, we remind that the
number of countries implementing strict EMF limits for UE
is extremely limited in contrast to the 5G gNB limits reported
of Fig. 11(a) (groups 1-4). On the other hand, the number of
countries adopting ICNIRP/FCC limits with plans to exploit
5G UE is consistently higher compared to the 5G gNB case
(groups 5-7, 9-11). Eventually, the number of countries with
unknown limits and no plan to exploit 5G devices is not
negligible (group 16), and similar to the 5G gNBs case.
In summary, the analysis conducted so far on UE reveals
that there is a lower jeopardization of limits across the coun-
tries compared to the 5G gNBs case. While this condition will
decrease the health risks perceptions associated to 5G UE,
we need to remind that the number of countries without any
plan to adopt 5G devices (with ICNIRP/FCC limits or with
unknown limits) is very large.
4) Population-based Analysis: So far, we have conducted
our analysis by counting the number of countries that fall
within each group in the matrices of Fig. 11. However, a
natural question emerges here: What is the impact of each
group when we consider the population in each country?
To answer this interesting question, we have weighed each
country by its population (in percentage w.r.t. the global
population), and we summed up the weighed countries falling
in each group. Fig. 12(a)-12(b) report the obtained matrices for
the 5G gNB and UE cases, respectively. When the population
weight is introduced for the 5G gNB case (Fig. 12(a)), we
can note that almost 40% of the world population is living in
countries where 5G is implemented as a mixture of coverage
and capacity, under strict EMF limits (group 2). As a result,
the perception of health risks associated to 5G gNBs will be
extremely high in those countries. However, we can note that
the percentage of people living in countries with 5G gNBs
implementations under ICNIRP/FCC limits is not negligible
(groups 5-7, 9-11). Eventually, 26% of the world population
will be subject to ICNIRP limits, without any implementation
of 5G gNBs (group 8). Finally, the percentage of people living
in countries with unknown limits is overall pretty limited, i.e.,
lower than 5% (groups 13-16).
We then repeat the population-based analysis by considering
the UE, as shown in Fig. 12(b). Interestingly, the outcome
appears to be more homogeneous compared to the 5G gNBs
population-based case (Fig. 12(a)) as well as the country-based
analysis (Fig. 11). In particular, the percentage of people living
22
Fig. 14. World map with countries colored according to the EMF limits on SAR and/or PD (strict, ICNIRP/FCC, unknown) and UE deployment (5G, no
5G) - Most of micro states are omitted (Figure best viewed in colors).
in countries imposing ICNIRP/FCC UE limits and having
plans to deploy 5G networks (groups 5-7, 9-11 in Fig. 12(b))
is predominant w.r.t. the unknown (groups 13-16) and strict
cases (groups 1-4). In addition, we can note that, although
the number of countries imposing FCC limits and exploiting
5G terminals appears to be limited (groups 5-7 in Fig. 11(b)),
their population weight is very large (groups 5-7 in Fig. 12(b)),
i.e., always higher than 20% w.r.t the world population. As a
result, we believe that the risk conditions (either perceived or
potential) will be avoided for most of the population when
considering 5G UE.
5) Geographical Analysis: In the following, we move our
attention to the geographical jeopardization of EMF limits and
5G implementation at a country level. We initially focus on
the 5G gNBs. To this aim, Fig. 13 reports the world map,
by differentiating with different colors: i) countries enforcing
strict EMF limits with 5G gNBs implementation (coral color),
ii) countries enforcing strict EMF limits without 5G gNBs
implementation (dark yellow color), iii) countries enforcing
ICNIRP/FCC limits with 5G gNB implementation (dark green
color), iv) countries enforcing ICNIRP/FCC limits without 5G
gNB implementation (light green color), v) countries enforcing
unknown EMF limits with 5G gNBs (dark blue color), and vi)
countries enforcing unknown EMF limits without any plan of
5G gNBs deployment (light blue).
Several considerations hold by analyzing in more detail
Fig. 13. First, most of the countries in Europe are deploy-
ing/have plans to install 5G gNB. However, the EMF limits
notably vary across Europe, with different countries imposing
strict limits and other countries enforcing ICNIRP/FCC limits.
Second, a large number of countries previously included in
the Soviet Union are still implementing strict EMF limits,
without any plan to deploy 5G gNBs. Third, countries in the
Mid East typically employ FCC/ICNIRP limits. However, the
deployment of 5G gNBs is planned only in a limited subset
of countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, and Djibouti). However, in this region, there are also
countries enforcing strict EMF limits, e.g., Israel and Kuwait.
Fourth, many countries in the Far East are planning to deploy
5G gNBs. However, a considerable variability in terms of
EMF limits is experienced in these countries, being China
and India enforcing strict EMF limits. Fourth, countries in
Oceania generally enforce ICNIRP/FCC limits. Despite this
fact, the implementation of 5G gNBs is limited to a subset
of countries (e.g., Australia and New Zealand). Besides, we
remark that the majority of the micro-states in Oceania (not
reported in the map due to their limited land size) are applying
ICNIRP/FCC limits without any 5G implementation. Fifth,
many countries in Africa are enforcing ICNIRP/FCC limits.
However, the number of states with unknown limits is far to
be negligible. In any case, the implementation of 5G networks
in this continent will be extremely limited. Sixth, Chile is
the only country in South America with strict EMF limits.
On the other hand, ICNIRP/FCC limits are widely adopted
in this continent. Moreover, the deployment of 5G gNBs will
be realized in different countries of the continent. Seventh,
North America will implement 5G networks by applying
ICNIRP/FCC limits. The only country imposing (slightly)
stricter limits than ICNIRP/FCC is Canada.
Summarizing, the geographical jeopardization of EMF lim-
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TABLE XI
COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR 5G EXPOSURE.
Assessment Methodology
Simulation-Based Measurement-BasedDocument
gNB UE gNB UE
Relevance for 5G Exposure
- Reproducible and conservative measurement procedures of PD;
- Multiple transmitters or antennas for UE;
- Different UE positions (including in front of the face);
P63195-1 [139] Yes
- Frequencies from 6 [GHz] to 300 [GHz];
- Conservative, repeatable and reproducible computation procedures
of PD;
- Multiple transmitters or antennas for UE;
- Different UE positions (including in front of the face);
IE
E
E
P63195-2 [140] Yes
- Frequencies from 6 [GHz] to 300 [GHz];
- Procedures for determining the field strength and SAR in the vicinity
of gNB;
- RF source may be a single antenna or a set of antennas;
62232 [88] Yes Yes
- gNB frequencies up to 100 [GHz] are considered;
- Procedures for measuring the UE SAR;
- Frequencies up to 6 [GHz] are considered;62209 [90], [92] Yes
- Different UE positions (including in front of the face);
- Case studies implementing the procedures detailed in IEC 62232
[88];
- Considered metrics include incident field, SAR and PD;
- Different categories of gNB;
IE
C
62669 [89] Yes Yes
- One case study includes a massive MIMO compliance assessment;
- Based on IEC 62232 [88] and IEC 62209 [90], [92];
K.52 [141] Yes Yes
- SAR methodologies up to 6 [GHz]
- Based on IEC 62232 [88];
K.61 [142] Yes Yes
- Frequencies up to 300 [GHz] are considered.
- Based on IEC 62232 [88];
K.70 [84] Yes - A simplified method for the calculation of the compliance distances
(which takes into account also 5G) and an EMF software (which needs
to be updated for 5G sites) are included.
- Site evaluation procedures already include frequencies used by 5G
K.83 [143] Yes
equipment.
- Based on IEC 62232 [88], IEC 62209 [90], [92];
- Frequencies up to 300 [GHz] are considered;
- Typical sources of radiation do not include 5G;
K.91 [144] Yes Yes Yes
- Examples of real measurements do not include 5G equipment.
- Conservative EIRP computation (applicable also to 5G gNB);
- Introduced the idea of continuous monitoring of maximum transmit-
ted power or EIRP;
- Simplified assessment procedures covering frequencies up to
40 [GHz];
IT
U
-T
K.100 [145] Yes Yes
- Guidance to compute the power density for different technologies
given selective measurements does not include 5G equipment.
- General document integrating previous ITU-T K recommendations;
K.121 [146] Yes Yes
- Useful as a starting reference for 5G operators and governments.
- Useful for operators performing maintenance on the gNB;
- Two sub-6 GHz frequencies are considered;
K.122 [147] Yes
- Two case studies based on point-to-point links exploiting frequencies
comparable to mm-Waves are also reported.
K Supplement 13 [85] Yes - Conservative SAR assessment technique (can be applied to 5G UE).
- General discussion about the impact of EMF limits stricter than
K Supplement 14 [118] Yes
ICNIRP on the deployment of 5G networks.
- Based on IEC 62669 [89], IEC 62232 [88] and IEC 62209 [90],
[92];
- Indications of future releases of relevant IEC documents are provided;
K Supplement 16 [148] Yes Yes Yes
- Compliance assessment tailored to 5G equipment.
24
its and 5G implementation clearly emerges when considering
the deployment of 5G gNBs. Consequently, the fear of the
associated health effects will be very different across different
countries. The lack of 5G implementations, coupled with the
fact that in many countries the EMF limits are still unset, is an
obvious barrier for the deployment of 5G gNBs in the African
continent. On the other hand, the differences in terms of EMF
limits in Europe, as well as in the Far East, will inevitably
impact the deployment of 5G networks in these regions.
In the final part of our analysis, we consider the geograph-
ical jeopardization of EMF limits and 5G implementations
when considering the UE. Fig. 14 reports the obtained outcome
by adopting the same set of colors used in Fig. 13. By mutually
comparing Fig. 14 against Fig. 13, we can see that the EMF
limits for 5G UE are much more homogeneous across the
world compared to the ones adopted by gNBs. Specifically, the
ICNIRP/FCC limits on SAR and/or PD of the UE are adopted
by most of the countries in the world. As previously pointed
out, one exception is represented by Belarus and Armenia,
which adopt UE limits stricter than ICNIRP/FCC. In addition,
different countries in Africa and Asia do not adopt any limit,
and they are not planning to exploit 5G UE. Therefore, the
perceived health risks will be higher in such countries. In
any case, we can conclude that the level of geographical
jeopardization appears to be much more limited compared to
the 5G gNBs case.
D. Compliance Assessment of 5G Exposure
We now review the main methodologies to perform the
compliance assessment of 5G exposure w.r.t. the RF limits.
We focus on the policies defined in the IEEE [139], [140] and
IEC standards [88]–[90], [92], as well as in the ITU recom-
mendations [84], [141]–[147] (complemented by supplements
[85], [118], [148]), which assume ICNIRP 1998 [95] or IEEE
C95.1 [96], [97] as underlying limits. However, we also point
out that national regulations may impose specific rules for
the compliance assessment of RF exposure. For example, in
Italy, local municipalities often impose a minimum distance
constraint between a site hosting RF equipment and a sensitive
place (e.g., school, hospital, church). This constraint is additive
w.r.t. national and international regulations. In this work,
however, we concentrate on international guidelines for the
compliance assessment, due to multiple reasons. First, since
5G is a relatively new technology, the local regulations may
not include revisions of the assessment of compliance tailored
to 5G equipment. Second, it is expected that the compliance
assessment policies defined by ITU, IEC, and IEEE will be
implemented in the national regulations in the forthcoming
years.
In this context, a natural question arises: If the current
regulations do not integrate the compliance assessment of 5G
exposure, is it safe to install 5G equipment and to adopt
5G UE at present? The answer is affirmative: current RF
limits are already defined for all the frequencies (including
the ones used by 5G). Besides, current regulations for the
compliance assessment can also be applied to 5G devices by
introducing very conservative (and worst-case) assumptions,
which always guarantee the population’s safety. For example,
the installation of 5G gNBs used for experimental trials in
Italy is authorized by assuming an ideal maximum power that
is radiated when all the beams are simultaneously activated
in all the directions [80]. However, we stress the importance
of revising the current regulations by considering the realistic
modeling and measurement of 5G features, to better assess the
5G exposure.12
Tab. XI overviews the main methodologies for the com-
pliance assessment of 5G exposure. We divide the standards
based on the following indicators: i) simulation-based proce-
dures for 5G gNB, ii) simulation-based procedures for 5G
UE, iii) measurement-based procedures for 5G gNB, and
iv) measurement-based procedures for 5G UE. Clearly, the
methodologies in i)-ii) can be applied during the planning
phase of the 5G network and during the design of UE. On
the other hand, the procedures in iii)-iv) are useful in order to
assess the compliance of 5G networks under operation and/or
already designed UE that have to be tested/monitored. In
addition, the table reports a brief summary for each document,
by detailing the features that are relevant to 5G exposure.
Several considerations hold by analyzing the methodolo-
gies in Tab. XI from the perspective of 5G communications
engineering. First, IEEE define in [139], [140] the method-
ologies to assess the compliance of UE at both simulation
and measurement levels. Specifically, the PD is taken as a
reference metric, with a range of frequencies between 6 [GHz]
and 300 [GHz]. Therefore, the procedures in [139], [140] are
of high interest in the context of 5G communications, and in
particular, for UE exploiting mm-Waves. Also, different UE
positions (including the one in front of the head) are taken
into account, thus matching the actual usage of UE during
gaming, social networking, and video streaming. Although
the documents in [139], [140] are still at a draft level, it
is expected that the final versions will be finalized in 2020.
Hence, they will be fully exploited by 5G UE manufacturers
and organizations involved in controlling the exposure of 5G
equipment. Second, the IEC standards [88], [90], [92] are
focused on the assessment of compliance of 5G gNB and 5G
UE. More in-depth, IEC 62232 [88] targets the assessment
of compliance of SAR from gNB, by considering approaches
based on simulation and/or measurement of the exposure.
In addition, the frequencies taken into account include mm-
Waves (up to 100 [GHz]). Eventually, IEC 62232 [88] is
complemented by IEC 62669 [89], which includes a set
of representative case studies that implement the procedures
of [88]. The document [89] is particularly relevant for the
compliance assessment of 5G gNB exposure. For example,
one case study is tailored to the compliance assessment of a
5G MIMO gNB. Moreover, different types of gNBs are taken
into account (e.g., macro cells and small cells). Moreover, the
procedures in [89] include the evaluation of PD in addition to
SAR. Hence, they can be directly mapped to the corresponding
PD-based limits defined by the international organizations
for 5G gNB exposure. Focusing on the UE, the IEC 62209
12We refer the interested reader [80] for an overview of the modifications
planned for the Italian country.
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documents [90], [92] detail the procedures for the compliance
assessment of UE SAR. In this case, frequencies up to 6 [GHz]
are considered (thus excluding mm-Waves). In line with the
IEEE procedures [139], [140] different UE positions are taken
into account by [90], [92]. However, in contrast to [139], [140],
the considered metric is SAR (and not PD).
In the following, we move our attention to the ITU-T
recommendations [84], [141]–[147], which are reported in the
bottom of Tab. XI. In general, ITU-T provides brief docu-
ments, which can be used by the governments in order to build
national specific regulations for the compliance assessment
of 5G exposure. For this reason, most of ITU documents
refer to the IEC standards for the details about the compli-
ance assessment procedures. Moreover, the ITU documents
integrate the previous standards by: i) defining simplified
installation procedures for gNB, based on different installation
types [141], [145], ii) defining clear rules to differentiate
between far field and near field exposure assessment [142], iii)
proposing mitigation techniques to reduce the exposure in case
the limits are not met [84], [141], iv) providing software and
simplified models for the computation of the exposure in the
different field regions [84], v) defining solutions to monitor the
EMF levels [143], [145], with both broadband and frequency-
selective measurements, vi) providing procedures to compute
the actual maximum EIRP [145], which is then used in the
compliance assessment procedures (e.g., the IEC ones), vii)
providing high level views of the compliance assessment that
may be useful for decision-makers [146] and viii) providing
information for the assessment procedures in the vicinity of
base stations [147] (which can be applied to workers operating
on the site for maintenance operations).
Finally, we review the ITU-T supplements [85], [118],
[148], which also include relevant information for the compli-
ance assessment of 5G exposure. Specifically, K Supplement
13 [85] is tailored to the identification of the factors to
determine the SAR from UE. Additionally, a conservative SAR
assessment technique (which can be applied to 5G UE) is
analyzed. K Supplement 14 [118] is instead tailored to the
evaluation of the impact of national limits stricter than ICNIRP
and/or IEEE on the planning of 4G and 5G networks. In
particular, strict regulations introduce several negative aspects,
such as difficulty in using the full available spectrum, a
limitation in the network densification, and a significant barrier
to the technology innovation. Eventually, K Supplement 16
[148] is devoted to the compliance assessment of exposure
from 5G gNB and 5G UE, by providing indications to the
relevant IEC standards, as well as by including different case
studies based on 5G (e.g., a massive MIMO gNB and a small
cell).
Summarizing, different organizations (IEEE, IEC, ITU)
provide guidelines (or draft of guidelines) for the compliance
assessment of 5G exposure. Moreover, a great effort is cur-
rently devoted to the compliance assessment of exposure from
gNB (with both simulation-based and measurement-based
approach). When focusing on the UE, most of the approaches
are based on SAR and PD measurement. Although revisions
of different procedures (e.g., [144], [145]) are still needed to
integrate case studies tailored to 5G, we can conclude that
the compliance assessment of 5G exposure is overall already
defined.
IV. HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH 5G FEATURES
In this section, we analyze the health risks associated
with key 5G features from the communications engineering
perspective. Our goal is, in fact, not to survey the entire set of
5G features, but to concentrate on the ones that trigger health
concerns among the population. More in-depth, we focus on
the following controversial aspects:
• extensive adoption of massive MIMO and beamforming;
• densification of 5G sites over the territory;
• adoption of frequencies in the mm-Wave bands;
• connection of millions of Internet of Things (IoT) de-
vices;
• coexistence of 5G with legacy technologies.
Since our goal is tailored to the communications engineering
perspective, we consider health risks in terms of exposure
generated by 5G gNB and by 5G UE. To this aim, Tab. XII
reports the considered 5G features, the corresponding aspects
in the context of 5G communications, together with the
relevant references. In the following, we provide more details
about each feature and each work reported in Tab. XII .
A. Extensive Adoption of Massive MIMO and Beamforming
We initially analyze the impact of massive MIMO and
beamforming on the exposure from 5G devices. We focus
on the following features: i) increase of power and number
of radiating elements, ii) introduction of statistical exposure
models, iii) measurement of exposure levels.
1) Increase of Power and Number of Radiating Elements:
When considering 5G devices implementing MIMO and beam-
forming, two essential differences emerge w.r.t. legacy ones,
and namely: i) a general increase in the maximum output
power, and ii) an increase in the number of radiating elements.
Focusing on the total power radiated by 5G gNB, data sheets
of macro equipment available in the market report a maximum
output power equal to 200 [W] [76]. On the other hand, 4G
base stations radiate a consistent lower amount of power,
e.g., in the order of 10-100 [W] [175]. Therefore, a natural
question arises: Is this increase of maximum power directly
translated into an increase of exposure, and consequently, in an
increase of the health risks? To answer this question, we need
to recall how 5G gNBs will exploit MIMO. In fact, the MIMO
technology is not new, and it has been in use for several years
[149]. The main idea of MIMO is to exploit multiple antennas
taking advantage of independent propagation paths to improve
the transmission. With massive MIMO the number of antenna
elements is radically increased (with a typical size of more
than 64 elements) to further improve the system capacity.
In general, spatial multiplexing and beamforming are two
key features implemented in 5G systems exploiting massive
MIMO. As clearly detailed by [149], spatial multiplexing
allows transmitting independent data over multiple uncorre-
lated paths. In contrast, beamforming allows concentrating the
power of each antenna element on a specific user who needs
to be served. Thanks to such features, the radiation pattern
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TABLE XII
TAXONOMY OF HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH 5G FEATURES AND RELEVANT ASPECTS IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING.
5G Feature Relevant Aspects References
Increase of power and number of radiating elements [149]–[153]
Introduction of statistical exposure models [87], [154], [155]Extensive adoption of massive MIMO and beamforming
Measurement of exposure levels [14], [149], [152], [156]–[159]
Computation of RF pollution at selected locations [160]
Computation of average received power [161]Densification of 5G sites over the territory
Impact of strict EMF limits on densification [63], [118]
Deployment status of mm-Waves [153], [161]
Adoption of frequencies in the mm-Wave bands
mm-Waves device exposure evaluation [153], [162], [163]
Maximum output power levels [164], [165]
Connection of millions of IoT devices
Data-rate and delay requirements [166], [167]
Saturation levels of legacy pre-5G networks [64], [168], [169]
Impact of radio and TV broadcasting [64], [170], [171]Coexistence of 5G with legacy technologies
Interaction with weather satellites [172]–[174]
of 5G gNB is radically different compared to those of legacy
technologies. In particular, the radiation pattern implemented
by 4G base stations with MIMO is mostly static, i.e., with
fixed beams over the territory. On the other hand, 5G gNBs
exploiting massive MIMO adapt radiation patterns that are
dynamically varied in space and time, i.e., to match the traffic
conditions and/or the positioning of the users over the territory.
Therefore, although the total power consumption of a 5G
gNB is consistently higher than the one of a 4G gNB, the
exposure exhibits a different pattern in time and space. As a
consequence, the total power that is radiated by a 5G MIMO
gNB is not spread over the entire coverage area, but it tends
to be concentrated on specific portions of the territory and
wisely modulated based on the network and traffic conditions.
For example, according to [150] (and references therein), the
current exposure from 5G gNB is four times lower than the
maximum exposure in 95% of all cases. In any case, however,
it is very unlikely that the whole power radiated by a 5G gNB
will concentrate on a single beam with the maximum antenna
gain for a time period sufficiently long, i.e., in the order
of minutes. Therefore, despite the increase in the maximum
radiated power of 5G gNB, the expected exposure from 5G
gNB will be in line (and in general lower) compared to legacy
technologies.
Eventually, the authors of [151] present a numerical ap-
proach for assessing the exposure of massive MIMO gNB in
indoor environments, by combining a ray-tracing technique
and the time-domain method to estimate the SAR on a
phantom. The authors then compute the maximum power
admissible for a 5G gNB to ensure that the estimated SAR
is below the ICNIRP limit of 2 [W/kg] at a distance of 8 [m].
Interestingly, the maximum power per antenna is at most
equal to 110 [W] in the worst scenario. However, since the
considered environment is an indoor scenario, the 5G gNB can
be implemented with a small cell (and not with a macro one),
thus being able to employ an output power consistently lower
than the maximum values extracted by the authors. Therefore,
the perceived health risks are minimized in this case.
In parallel with the increase of power, another aspect that
characterizes 5G devices is the increase in the the number of
radiating elements. In general, the size of 5G gNB tends to be
larger than that of legacy technologies, due to the need to host
the circuitry to power the antenna elements [152]. Although
this aspect is not a problem in cellular deployments (especially
for roof-mounted and poles installations), the increase of size
may be associated to a higher exposure. Focusing on 5G UE,
it is expected that multiple antenna elements (up to 8) will be
exploited by terminals implementing full 5G functionalities
[153]. However, no change in the size of the UE is planned.
Therefore, the expected impact on the user side in terms of
perceived health risks will be marginal.
2) Introduction of Statistical Exposure Models: Traditional
methods to estimate the exposure from base stations are
based on very conservative assumptions, including maximum
transmission power and static beams in all the covered area
directions. Although such assumptions are, in general, valid
for legacy technologies, they tend to be overly conservative
when considering 5G gNB [154]. In general, the application
of conservative assumptions to estimate the exposure from
5G gNB is detrimental for the health risks due to two main
reasons. On one side, the exclusion zone of each 5G gNB
tends to be very large, i.e., in the order of several dozen meters
[75]. On the other hand, the predicted exposure levels tend to
be pretty high [75], thus triggering health concerns by the
population. Therefore, the exposure estimation of 5G gNB is
based on the introduction of statistical models [87], [154],
[155], which allow on one side to better assess the size of the
exclusion zone of the gNB, and on the other one to estimate the
predicted exposure levels over the territory in a more realistic
way.
In this context, [87] introduces a statistical model to take
into account multiple factors, such as the gNB utilization, the
time-division duplex, the scheduling time, as well as the spatial
distribution of the users in the covered area. Results show
that, by applying the presented model, the largest maximum
power is less than 15% w.r.t. the corresponding theoretical
one. Consequently, the exclusion zone can be reduced by a
factor of 2.6 compared to a traditional methodology. Similarly,
[154] presents a statistical approach by leveraging on the
three-dimensional spatial channel model standardized by 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Results show that the
exclusion zone of a massive MIMO gNB, computed through
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the statistical model, is reduced by half compared to the ones
obtained by a traditional approach (i.e., not based on statistical
parameters). Eventually, the authors of [155] compute the
probability that multiple antenna elements of 5G massive
MIMO gNB are radiating with the actual maximum power
over the same point of the territory and at the same time.
Results show that the probability of this event is clearly lower
than the case with a single antenna element.
In summary, the high dynamicity introduced in power
radiated by 5G gNB implementing MIMO and beamforming
imposes to consider statistical models to more realistically
compute both the exposure levels and the size of exclusion
zones compared to traditional approaches. This step could
be beneficial to reduce the health risks perceived by the
population.
3) Measurement of Exposure Levels: A third aspect that has
to be considered is the measurement of exposure levels due
to the large adoption of MIMO and beamforming features.
Focusing on gNB, the authors of [14] point out that the
methodologies used to measure the exposure in legacy net-
works are not always suitable for assessing the exposure of 5G
gNBs exploiting massive MIMO and beamforming. In general,
such features may cause uncertainties in the estimation of
the field strength, according to [156]. This aspect may be an
issue for the health risks that are perceived by the population.
However, as also suggested by [156], a possible solution could
be to force the system to generate a maximum toward the
direction of the measurement position. Obviously, this step
requires either to position one or more UE in the vicinity of
the measurement probe and/or to perform the measurement in
cooperation with the operator owing the 5G gNB.
In general, the measurement procedure of 5G gNB involves
either wide-band probes operating on a given range of fre-
quencies, or narrow-band probes that are able to retrieve infor-
mation on the field strength on a set of selected frequencies.
Focusing on the former methodology, the authors of [157]
measure the output power levels of a 5G gNB, by exploiting
massive MIMO in an operational network. Interestingly, the
time-averaged power transmitted on a given beam direction is
lower than the maximum theoretical output power. In addition,
the maximum field strength measured in the proximity of the
5G gNB represents a tiny fraction (lower than 6%) compared
to the one that is estimated by assuming a maximum power
transmission. In line with [157], the authors of [149] perform
a measurement campaign of the field strength of a 4G base
station implementing massive MIMO. Although the considered
base station belongs to legacy technologies, the measured
exposure levels are meaningful in the context of 5G, thanks to
the adoption of massive MIMO in the considered scenario. The
obtained results demonstrate that, even when the base station
is fully loaded, the measured field strength is a small ratio
(lower than 17%) compared to the maximum ICNIRP limit for
occupational exposure. Therefore, both the works [149], [157]
indicate exposure levels lower than the theoretical ones, and
in general lower than the limits. Although further assessments
are required (e.g., by extending the measurement to other op-
erational networks and to different traffic conditions), current
results indicate that the exposure from gNB implementing
massive MIMO will be overall limited, thus minimizing the
overall risks for the population.
In the following step, we focus on the assessment of
exposure through narrow-band measurements. More in detail,
[158] aims at identifying the Synchronization Signal Block,
in order to assess the power density carried by its resources
and to finally extrapolate the theoretical maximum exposure
level. The authors consider a location at around 60 [m] from
the 5G gNB (in LOS conditions), at a close distance (around
7 [m]) from the UE. Also, a constant fixed beam, oriented
towards the position of the UE, is enforced at the 5G gNB
site. Interestingly, the measured exposure is at most equal
to 3.716 [V/m] in the worst case (achieved by imposing a
100% of downlink traffic load). By applying the methodology
detailed in IEC 62232 [88], a theoretical maximum field
strength of 5.537 [V/m] is obtained. It is important to remark
that this value is lower than the maximum limit for countries
adopting ICNIRP/FCC-based regulations (see Tab. IX), and
thus being able to limit the health risks perceived by the
population. On the other hand, this value is very close or
above the maximum limit for different countries imposing
regulations stricter than ICNIRP/FCC (reported in Fig. 10).
Clearly, in such countries, the associated health risks of 5G
gNB deployments similar to [158] may be highly perceived
by the population.
Moreover, the authors of [159] point out that the maximum
EMF level in a given location is a combination of three factors,
namely: i) the total number of subcarriers of the carrier,
which depends on the signal bandwidth and the numerology,
i) the fraction of the signal frame reserved for downlink
transmission, iii) the maximum EMF level measured for a
single resource element, which in turns depends on different
other metrics (including a factor depending on the serving
beam). Interestingly, the importance of adopting UE forcing
full load traffic in the vicinity of the measurement point is
stressed by the authors. Eventually, the authors of [152] define
the experimental procedures for estimating the relevant factors
associated with time division duplexing and beam sweeping,
which are then used to extrapolate the maximum field strength
from the exposure measurements.
Summarizing, current works tailored to the measurement
of the incident EMF field strength from 5G gNB exploiting
MIMO and beamforming reveal that the overall exposure is
limited and in general lower than the maximum theoretical
values. Although further efforts are needed, e.g., to extend the
outcomes by measuring the EMF over different operational
networks and different traffic conditions, the current literature
indicates that the health risks from exposure can be minimized.
However, we stress the fact that the measured EMF is highly
influenced by the traffic and the user activity in the proximity
of the measurement probe. Therefore, it is of fundamental
importance to setup a proper (and meaningful) measurement
scenario.
B. Densification of 5G sites over the Territory
A second controversial aspect among the population is that
the pervasive installation of 5G gNBs over the territory results
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in an exponential increase of exposure, thus leading to an
unacceptable increase of the health risks. The closest works in-
vestigating this issue from a scientific point of view are [160],
[161]. More in detail, the authors of [160] develop a very
simple model to evaluate the RF pollution at selected locations
of the territory (i.e., at an average or a minimum distance from
the serving gNB). A set of closed-form expressions are then
derived from the model, to evaluate the increase/decrease of
RF pollution among a pair of candidate gNB deployments
that are characterized by different gNB densities over the
same service area. By leveraging on a set of worst-case and
common assumptions (which include, e.g., a homogeneous
set of gNB of regular size, maximum radiated power, and
simultaneous activation of all the beams by each gNB), the
authors demonstrate that, when a given performance level has
to be ensured (e.g., in terms of minimum received power),
the densification of the 5G network allows to promptly reduce
the RF pollution. This result can also be explained in a very
intuitive way: in a network with a high density of gNB, each
site has to cover a small service area, and hence the required
output power can be limited. On the other hand, a network
composed of few gNB is characterized by a huge coverage area
for each site, and hence higher radiated power. Therefore, in
contrast to the common opinion of the population, the increase
in the number of 5G gNBs allows to reduce the exposure at the
selected locations (i.e., at an average distance or a minimum
one from the serving gNB). Eventually, the authors of [160]
considers a scenario where the minimum received power and
the number of 5G gNBs are jointly increased, showing that,
even in this case, the RF pollution estimated at the selected
locations is limited.
The outcomes of [160] are further corroborated by [161],
in which the authors evaluate the average received power over
a whole territory and a set of candidate deployments. Results
demonstrate that the average received power is dramatically
reduced when the number of 5G gNB is increased. Conse-
quently, the associated health risks are minimized. Moreover,
another aspect that can be observed from the network densi-
fication considered in [160] is the harmonization of exposure.
When a network is composed of few gNBs, the users in close
proximity to the sites tend to be exposed to higher levels of
exposure compared to the ones that are far from the gNB.
On the other hand, when the number of gNB is increased,
the exposure tends to be more uniform over the territory. This
issue is usually neglected by the population and may have a
significant impact on the perceived health risks.
In any case, however, it is essential to remark that the
densification of the network is impacted by the EMF re-
gulations, which tend to limit the installation of 5G gNBs
over the territory. This is especially true in countries adopting
exposure limits stricter than ICNIRP/FCC [118], for which
the installation of 5G gNB is prevented, e.g., in proximity
to sensitivity places and/or in the presence of other RF
installations. Although this aspect may appear beneficial for
the health risks at first glance, the actual exposure levels are
negatively impacted by strict regulations. To this aim, the
authors of [63] perform a broad set of exposure measurements
in a 4G operational network that is deployed under very strict
regulations. Results show that strict regulations limiting the
installation of 4G base stations have a negative impact on
the exposure levels generated by UE and on the performance
perceived by users. In particular, the lack of 4G base stations
in the neighborhood under consideration forces the UE to
be served by base stations that are typically far (i.e., more
than 1000 [m]) and in NLOS conditions. This issue results
in a large electric field activity generated by the UE and
poor performance levels in terms of low throughput and large
amount of time to transfer data in the uplink direction.
C. Adoption of Frequencies in the mm-Wave bands
The third controversial aspect triggering concerns by the
population is the adoption of mm-Waves in 5G. To this aim,
we remind that the biological impact of mm-Waves have been
studied in the past years, although not in the context of cellular
communications (see e.g., [176]–[181]). However, previous
works investigating the health impact of mm-Waves did not
find any adverse effect for exposure below the limits enforced
by law. A similar observation is also reported by WHO [182].
Moreover, the same organization is currently conducting a
health risk assessment of exposure over the entire range of
RF range (including mm-Waves), which will be completed by
2022 (i.e., in parallel with the deployment of the 5G networks).
This step would be beneficial to reduce the health risks of 5G
that are perceived by the population.
In the following, we move our attention to radio commu-
nications from 5G gNBs exploiting mm-Waves. In general,
such devices will be installed in scenarios where very high
capacity is required [183]. However, it is important to remark
that mm-Waves are subject to very large path losses compared
to micro-waves [184]. Also, other effects, including, e.g., low
penetration capabilities inside the buildings, severely impact
the maximum distance between a gNB and a UE operating
at these frequencies. As a consequence, 5G deployments
exploiting mm-Waves will be mainly realized through micro
and small gNB, which will be placed in close proximity to
the service area [183]. This, in turn, naturally limits the scope
of application of mm-Waves, which will be not deployed on
the whole territory, but rather at traffic-demanding hotspots
(e.g., airports, stadiums, shopping malls). However, it is also
important to remind that 5G will be mainly realized with sub-
Ghz and sub-6 [GHz] in many countries in the world, and
thus already limiting the exploitation of mm-Waves in the near
future. For example, in Italy, the operators are not subject
to any coverage constraint over the mm-Wave frequencies,
while strict coverage constraints for lower 5G frequencies are
required [161]. As a result, the auction on 5G frequencies in
Italy resulted in a large competition among the operators over
sub-6 [GHz] frequencies, while a very limited competition was
observed for mm-Waves. Moreover, current international regu-
lations and current compliance assessment procedures already
hold for mm-Waves, thus ensuring health risk minimization.
However, we need to point out that measurement studies,
tailored to the assessment of exposure of 5G gNB, are needed,
in order to limit the perceived health risks by the population.
In the following part of our work, we focus on the exposure
from UE with mm-Waves. According to [153], 5G devices
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exploiting mm-Waves will be not realized with a very large
number of antenna elements, being 4-element or 8-element
antenna arrays the most promising solutions. However, pre-
vious works (e.g., [185]) consider the design of UE with
antenna arrays composed of a larger number of radiating
elements. Interestingly, the authors of [153] demonstrate that
the minimum peak EIRP of a 5G UE with mm-Waves satisfies
both ICNIRP, FCC and IEEE exposure limits. In addition,
the authors of [162], [163] point out the importance of
evaluating the PD in proximity to 5G UE with mm-Waves,
claiming that a traditional approach based on magnitude-based
field combination may led to very conservative estimation of
the peak spatial-average PD. Moreover, a more accurate PD
assessment, based on the magnitude and phase of the EMFs,
is advocated.
D. Connection of Millions of IoT Devices
A fourth controversial aspect among the population is the
effect on exposure due to the huge number of 5G terminals
that will be pervasively connected in the same area. In this
context, a common opinion is that massive deployments of
IoT terminals connected through 5G networks will result in
an unacceptable and continuous exposure for users. To this
aim, we analyze the problem from the perspective of the
communications engineering by reporting a set of evidences,
summarized as follows. First, current specifications defined by
3GPP always impose very low values of maximum transmitted
power for each terminal, even for 5G ones [164] (i.e., generally
at most equal to 23 [dBm] in the majority of the cases, and in
any case no higher than 35 [dBm]). Second, when considering
IoT terminals, more stringent power requirements may be
introduced [166], in order to reduce the consumption and to
increase the battery lifetime, in line with goals of Low Power
Wide Area Networks architectures [186]–[188]. For example,
typical values range between 23 [dBm] and 14 [dBm] [165].
Third, international regulations always impose maximum SAR
and/or PD values to control the exposure from the terminals,
thus guaranteeing safety for the population. Fourth, even in the
presence of millions of terminals in the same area, the distance
between the user and the terminal(s) will play a major role in
determining the exposure. For example, when the distance is in
the order of (few) meters, the exposure will be negligible, due
to the aforementioned very limited maximum output power
generated by the terminals. Also, the level of exposure may be
further reduced due to the presence of obstacles, e.g., walls in
the proximity of the terminals. Fifth, IoT communications are
in general very different compared to human communications
[166], [167]. In most of the cases, IoT devices will need to
communicate with the rest of the world at a small pace, with
a limited data rate, and with pretty large delays compared
to human-centered communications. This will be translated
into extremely low power levels in the uplink directions, and
consequently in very low levels of exposure.
E. Coexistence of 5G with Legacy Technologies
The last concern triggering health risks from the population
is the coexistence of 5G with legacy technologies. We analyze
the problem from the perspective of communications engi-
neering, under the following avenues: i) saturation levels in
pre-5G networks (i.e., 2G/3G/4G), ii) impact of radio and TV
broadcasting, and iii) interaction of 5G with weather satellites.
1) Saturation Levels of Legacy pre-5G Networks: As re-
ported by ITU [118], the installation of 5G sites is a challeng-
ing step in countries adopting EMF regulations stricter than
ICNIRP/FCC guidelines. The main effect that is observed is
the saturation of EMF levels to the maximum limits, especially
in urban zones served by multiple operators and by multiple
cellular technologies. In the presence of a saturation zone, the
deployment of new 5G gNBs is not possible, since otherwise,
the composite EMF levels from the new gNB and the already-
deployed base stations would surpass the (strict) limits. On the
other hand, the presence of these zones may also alarm the
population living in their neighborhood, and thus increasing
the perceived health risks associated to the installation of new
5G gNB.
In the literature, different works [12], [64], [168], [189]
focus on the analysis of saturation zones in cellular networks
subject to strict regulations. In this context, the EMF levels
are either estimated [12], [168] or measured in proximity to
the installations [64], [189]. Focusing on the former category,
the authors of [12] take into account the real base station
deployment in an urban area in Naples (Italy). Results show
that large saturation zones, in which the estimated EMF
exposure is close to the limits, already emerge. The problem
is also studied in [168], which is focused on the city of
Bologna (Italy). By applying a set of conservative assump-
tions, which include, e.g., free space path loss and maximum
radiated power from each deployed base station, the authors
demonstrate the presence of high saturation levels for almost
all the sites in the city center. Clearly, these sites can not be
used to host any new 5G gNB.
In the following, we focus on the works tailored to the
evaluation of saturation zones through measurements [64],
[189]. Interestingly, the average exposure observed by [64],
[189] is in general lower than the limits imposed by law. This
outcome is expected, as the works based on EMF estimations
[12], [168] typically introduce different assumptions, in terms
of, e.g., path loss models or maximum output power, which
may be very conservative in a real environment. Eventually, the
authors of [189] performed in an situ-measurement campaign
that was conducted in the same city of [168], showing that only
less than 1% of the total base stations locations are actually
saturated. In addition, the authors of [64] corroborate the
finding of [189], by extending the analysis over a whole region,
and by taking into consideration the measurement logs which
were collected over almost 20 years. Interestingly, the average
EMF levels present an increasing trend over the years, due
to the installation of subsequent technologies and operators
in the territory under consideration. In particular, if the EMF
levels will continue to grow with the current trend, a complete
saturation will occur in the forthcoming years. Hence, there
will be no possibility to install any further cellular equipment
co-located or in the vicinity of the already deployed base
stations.
Summarizing, saturation zones are a consequence of strict
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Fig. 15. House close to a radio broadcasting tower in San Jose - CA (photo
by Richard A. Tell). The EMF field measured in the proximity of the house
was higher than 61.4 [V/m].
regulations on EMF limits. In such zones, the installation of
5G gNBs would be very limited or even prevented at all.
Despite this fact may be (wrongly) perceived by the population
as an advantage in terms of health risks, it is solely due to the
application of the strict regulations, which are not based on any
scientific evidence for both short term and long term health
effects.
2) Impact of Radio and TV Broadcasting: In the following,
we move our attention to the coexistence of 5G with non-
cellular technologies, and in particular, on radio and/or TV
broadcasting. In this context, the authors of [170] performed
a wide-scale measurement study to assess the EMF levels
from radio and TV broadcasting in the USA, showing that the
exposure was higher than 1 [µ W/cm2] for more than 440000
residents. The study was then updated 40 years later, showing
that radio broadcasting radiates a consistently higher amount
of power compared to cellular equipment [171]. The exposure
from radio and TV repeaters w.r.t. cellular base stations is also
analyzed by [64]. Results prove that people living in proximity
to repeaters used for radio and/or TV broadcasting are subject
to exposure levels higher than those living in proximity to base
stations.
Summarizing, the exposure levels in the vicinity of radio/TV
broadcasting towers are far to be negligible. Therefore, these
sources should be carefully taken into account when deploying
5G gNBs, in order to minimize the health risks over the po-
pulation. However, we need to remind that the emissions from
radio/TV broadcasting are often underrated by the general
public, which is apparently more concerned with the exposure
from cellular networks. For example, Fig. 15 shows a photo
of a house almost co-located with a radio tower. The EMF
levels measured in the proximity of the house are higher than
the maximum limit imposed by law (set to 61.4 [V/m]).
3) Interaction of 5G with Weather Satellites: The 5G
frequencies belonging to the 24.25-27.5 [GHz] and 37-40.5
[GHz] bands are close to the ones used by satellites for weather
observation, i.e., 23.6-24 [GHz] and 36-37 [GHz]. Therefore,
the power radiated by 5G gNB and UE may interfere with
the sensing of water vapor and oxygen levels collected by
the weather satellites, thus (possibly) impacting the weather
information that is collected to monitor severe climate events,
and consequently posing a health risk for the population [172].
The problem has been extensively studied by NASA and
NOAA in [173], [174], which performed simulations with
parameters set in accordance with ITU-R M.2101 recommen-
dation [190]. Results show that a substantial noise limitation
has to be imposed to 5G gNBs and 5G UE, in order to avoid
interference problems with weather satellites. The outcomes
of [173], [174] were also discussed during the ITU World
Radiocommunication Conference 2019 [191], which instead
defined limits on unwanted emissions for the total radiated
power that are less conservative than [173], [174].
Several considerations hold when analyzing these outcomes
from the perspective of communications engineering. First,
the works [173], [174] assumed a pervasive deployment of
5G gNB and 5G UE operating at mm-Waves in urban zones.
However, current indications point out that the adoption of
5G gNB will be rather limited, i.e., not deployed in whole
urban areas like in [173], [174], but rather on specific locations
(i.e., airport, stadiums, shopping malls). Moreover, the com-
munications on mm-Waves will be one option among a set of
possibilities, which will also encompass lower frequencies that
do not interfere with the weather satellites. Fourth, as pointed
out by [192], the input parameters used in the simulations
of [173], [174] are based on very conservative assumptions,
i.e., no beamforming capabilities, simultaneous transmission
of gNB and UE in the same time slot, power overestimation
for UE and gNB, lack of the 250 [MHz] guard band for 5G,
and over simplified propagation conditions (without buildings
and foliage). Therefore, the outcomes of [173], [174] may be
not consistent with the ones achieved in a realistic setting.
Third, the set of limits defined by [191] is incremental. More
in-depth, looser limits will be initially applied to allow the
installation of devices operating on mm-Waves. Then, after
1st September 2027, a new set of limits, more conservative
than the current ones, will be applied. This choice appears
to be meaningful, as the impact of interference may increase
with the number of deployed devices. Fourth, as suggested by
[191], solutions to avoid the antenna pointing in the direction
of weather satellite sensors may be put into place in case
interference problems are detected.
V. RISK MITIGATION TECHNIQUES FOR 5G EXPOSURE
We then move our attention to the possible techniques that
can be put into place to reduce the health risks from the EMF
exposure from cellular networks. We refer the reader to [193],
[194] for an overview of the risk mitigation techniques in
cellular networks. In contrast to [193], [194], this section is
explicitly focused on the risk mitigation techniques tailored to
5G and beyond 5G networks.
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Fig. 16. Main techniques from the perspective of 5G communications to tackle the risk mitigation of 5G exposure.
Fig. 16 reports a graphical overview of the taxonomy that
we employ to analyze the risk mitigation, which is observed
through the lens of communications engineering. More in
detail, we group the techniques into the following categories:
1) device-based solutions aimed at designing SAR-aware 5G
UE or EMF-aware gNB;
2) architectural-based approaches aimed at reducing the
risks by introducing new architectural features in 5G
and beyond 5G networks, i.e., large intelligent surfaces
aided communications, vertical/horizontal densification
and network offloading;
3) network-based solutions aimed at developing EMF-aware
planning solutions for cellular networks or at managing
the radio resources and communication protocols to re-
duce the EMF;
4) regulation-based approaches are targeting risk reduction
through the dismission of legacy 2G/3G/4G networks,
harmonization of exposure limits, compliance assessment
procedures across the countries, definition of constraints
to limit the emissions from non-cellular RF sources, and
pervasively supporting EMF measurement campaigns and
the EMF data integration across national and international
databases.
A. Device-based Approaches
We initially focus on solutions targeting the reduction of
exposure at the level of individual devices. Henceforth, we
detail the design of SAR-aware UE and EMF-aware gNB.
1) SAR-aware UE Design: Traditionally, the goal of SAR-
aware UE design has been pursued since the advent of cellular
communications [195]. More in depth, previous techniques
were focused on the reduction of the head exposure due
to voice communications [196], [197]. To this aim, several
techniques have been developed in the literature to shield
the SAR generated towards the UE during voice calls [198]–
[200]). The main shielding methodologies can be classified
into: i) ferrite shields [198], ii) metamaterials [199] and iii)
parasitic radiators [200]. In the following, we shed light on
each of the aforementioned solutions.
In approaches based on ferrite shields, a ferrite sheet is
introduced between the UE antenna and the external UE cover,
in order to reduce the exposure to the head. Although the target
of lowering EMF exposure is, in general, accomplished, the
presence of the ferrite sheet may introduce negative impacts
on the antenna properties. For example, according to [198], the
antenna gain tends to be consistently reduced. In the context
of 5G, this aspect may be a significant drawback, due to the
fact that the antenna features have to be preserved, especially
for mm-Wave frequencies.
A second approach to provide RF shielding is based on the
exploitation of metamaterials, which are able to absorb the
EMF from the UE antenna and consequently to protect the
head [199]. Metamaterials are artificially fabricated materials
with customized electromagnetic characteristics that do not
exist in nature, e.g., a negative permittivity or permeability.
The metamaterial shield acts as a band-stop filter that can be
tuned to the operating frequency of the antenna by adjusting
the metamaterial dimension. Interestingly, simulation results
indicate a 30% reduction in the SAR at the expense of a
loss of almost 5% in the radiated power [199]. Eventually, the
performance of ferrite sheets and metamaterials are compared
using numerical simulation in [201], showing that ferrite sheets
are in general more effective than metamaterials in reducing
the SAR in the human head. However, it is important to remark
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that both [199], [201] are not tailored to 5G communications,
which require the deployment of multiple antenna elements on
the UE, and for which finding spare space for metamaterials
may be a concrete issue.
Regarding parasitic radiators based approaches, the main
idea is to employ a parasitic element that is embedded on
the UE ground plane [200]. More in detail, the parasitic
radiator is a passive element that is designed to control the
current distributions on the ground plane, thus leading to a
decreased SAR and an enhanced radiation pattern. However,
the passive element tends to occupy space on the ground
plane, which is already crowded with other integrated circuits
required for the UE operation. This aspect may be an issue
when considering 5G UE, which have to include a large
set of circuits, and, in particular, the ones realizing wireless
interfaces for 2G/3G/4G/5G and IEEE 802.11 connectivity.
In the following, we concentrate on other design choices
that may be relevant to the reduction of SAR in 5G UE.
The adopted techniques include: i) adjustment of UE radiation
patterns to reduce the exposure [195] and ii) integration
of multiple antenna arrays with dual-mode operation [202].
Focusing on the former solution, the authors of [195] define an
antenna array design for 5G UE to reduce the body exposure
associated with various mobile use cases, e.g., voice-calling,
video-calling, and texting. In the analyzed scenarios, a set
of smartphone sensors are exploited to infer the UE position
and orientation. Then, the relative phase between the antenna
elements is designed to direct the exposure away from the
part of the body currently exposed to the specific UE usage.
This technique is of particular interest to 5G, since the UE
will be used for a set of variegate services, which will result
in different exposure zones of the body, as well as different
EMF levels, in contrast to previous studies focused only on
head exposure [198]–[200].
A further improvement towards exposure reduction is then
tackled by [202], which targets the SAR-aware design of
beam-steerable array antenna operating at mm-Waves with
dual-mode operation. The main idea is to employ two distinct
sub-arrays that are placed in different UE positions, and
consequently, generate different exposure patterns. More in
detail, the first subarray is placed on the back cover, and it
is activated only when the user exploits voice services. On
the other hand, the second subarray is located at the upper
frame, and it is enabled only when the user utilizes video
or text services. By alternatively activating the two arrays
(based on the type of services employed by the user), a
peak SAR of 0.88 [W/kg] is achieved, a value much lower
compared to other competing solutions [203], [204] that do
no employ separate sub-arrays. However, the wide adoption
of the proposed approach in commercial devices is still an
open issue, again under the light of the lack of space due to
the presence of multiple wireless interfaces deployed on the
same UE.
In summary, different techniques can be exploited to reduce
the exposure from 5G UEs. Differently from approaches
adopted for legacy technologies based on voice services, 5G-
based solutions have to integrate a variegate set of exposure
UE types. Also, the co-location of 5G antenna arrays with
other wireless interfaces is already an issue, due to the limited
available space on the smartphone. Therefore, future work is
still needed to tackle the reduction of SAR for 5G UE at the
device level.
2) EMF-aware gNB Design: The second approach to re-
duce the EMF is to target the design of gNB integrating
exposure minimization. In contrast to legacy technologies, the
massive adoption of MIMO and beamforming in 5G allows to
dynamically focus the exposure on territory zones where the
5G service is currently needed. Thus, avoiding to pollute the
other zones where the 5G services are not required. There-
fore, an EMF-aware objective should be naturally targeted
during the design of 5G gNB, implementing MIMO and
beamforming. Therefore, further research in the field should
be devoted, e.g., for designing antenna elements that minimize
the exposure outside the main focus of each beam. This
last aspect, which is already tackled by 5G gNBs, is also
linked to interference reduction and, consequently, increased
throughput.
A second aspect, often underrated by the population, is
that the design of base stations with EMF minimization is
already in line with the goals of gNB manufacturers. In legacy
technologies (pre-5G), in fact, a large fraction of the total
base station power is used to feed its power amplifiers [205],
[206]. In line with this trend, the definition of EMF-aware
approaches for 5G gNB could lead to a reduction of the
radiated power and, consequently, the associated electricity
costs. In the literature, different works (see e.g., [207], [208])
are tailored to the energy-efficient design of base stations.
However, the assessment of the proposed approaches in terms
of EMF is, in general, not faced, while we advocate the need
to integrate it in the context of risk minimization.
Eventually, we point out that different gNB types (e.g., small
cells, macro cells) are subject to different levels of radiated
power, and consequently of EMF exposure. For example, the
ITU guidelines [209] define multiple power classes for the
base stations. In the context of 5G, we advocate the need
of pursuing different types of EMF-aware design approaches,
tailored to the gNB classes. For example, the classes of
gNB placed in close proximity to users (e.g., small cells and
picocells) should implement the most sophisticated techniques
to reduce EMF exposure. On the other hand, this goal is less
stringent for macro gNBs, as the (not negligible) distance
between the gNB and each user already contributes to limit
the exposure.
B. Architectural-based Approaches
In the following, we focus on solutions that require a
change at the architectural level (even going beyond currently
available 5G functionalities). To this aim, we analyze: i)
communications aided by large intelligent surfaces, ii) network
densification extended at both vertical and horizontal levels,
iii) network offloading.
1) Large Intelligent Surfaces Aided Communications: The
channel condition between gNBs and UE has a notable impact
on human exposure to EMF. The unfavorable channel status
is a crucial challenging issue for mm-Wave communications,
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Fig. 17. An example of how the adoption of MIMO, beamforming, large intelligent surfaces and narrow-beam FSO can improve the service level and reduce
the exposure levels over the territory (including sensitive places) w.r.t. current cellular networks.
where the LOS path can be easily obstructed by large-size
and small-size blockages, e.g., buildings and humans. Tradi-
tionally, this problem is solved through the introduction of
relay stations (see, e.g., [210]). By exploiting relays, in fact,
the original long and obstructed path is split into a subset
of links, each of them composed by a pair of interfaces in
LOS conditions. When a single relay is exploited, the UE-
gNB path is divided into two separate links, i.e., one between
the UE and the relay, and another one between the relay
and the gNB. From a communications perspective, relays can
increase both the coverage and the network throughput [211].
Nevertheless, relays are active transmitters with full RF chains
and dedicated power sources [212]. Therefore, from the health
risk perspective, the systematic adoption of relay stations may
further increase the EMF exposure over the territory.
In this context, a key question is: Is it possible to exploit
the functionalities of relays, without introducing additional RF
sources? One of the most promising techniques to tackle this
question is the adoption of large intelligent surfaces aided
communications. According to [213], such devices operate as
smart passive controllable scatterers, and they can improve
the wireless channel by reflecting the waves into desirable
directions to create LOS link for the UE. More in detail, the re-
configurable intelligence surfaces can be fabricated from meta-
materials that are equipped with programmable electronic
circuits to steer the incident wave into customizable ways
[214]. Compared to active relays, the scatterers are passive
elements, and therefore they do not increase the number of
RF sources radiating over the territory.
From a communications perspective, the adoption of large
intelligent surfaces introduces notable advantages, which in-
clude: i) coverage probability and signal-to-interference plus
noise ratio (SINR) improvement [215]–[217], ii) high energy
efficiency [218] and iii) low transmission power (also in the
uplink direction) [219]. To the best of our knowledge, the
impact in terms of EMF has not been yet analyzed. However,
we expect that the exploitation of large intelligent surfaces will
be of great help in reducing the exposure (from both gNB and
UE), and consequently, the associated health risks for beyond
5G networks [220]–[222]. To support the previous statement
with a clear example, Fig. 17 sketches a simple scenario
where MIMO, beamforming and large intelligent surfaces are
exploited. More in detail, the integrated architecture allows us
to easily reach the Quality of Service (QoS) requirements of
the users over the territory (e.g., the moving car in the figure or
the neighborhood on the top left part of the figure), by always
guaranteeing LOS conditions. On the other hand, the exposure
will be diverted from sensitive places (e.g., the central building
in the figure). It is important to remark that the current pre-
5G network (box on the top left of the figure) introduces an
EMF exposure that is spread over the territory (including on
sensitive buildings). Eventually, the future cellular architecture
will also exploit narrow-beam FSO for backhauling to further
reduce the exposure w.r.t. micro-waves links that are adopted
in the current networks [223], [224].
2) Vertical and Horizontal Densification: The goal of cel-
lular densification is to increase the number of gNB serving a
given portion of the territory. With vertical densification, the
number of gNB is increased by deploying different cellular
layers over the area (e.g., macro cells and small cells). This
feature is already exploited in pre-5G networks [225], e.g.,
to provide primary coverage with macro cells and hotspot
capacity with small cells. With 5G, the vertical densification
will be a pivotal aspect to control the level of exposure.
Thanks to the wide exploitation of heterogeneous networks,
the (low) emissions from gNB will be concentrated on the
zones where they are really needed (e.g., to provide capacity
in hot spots), and not over the whole territory. In addition,
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the deployment of multiple layers of gNB will be exploited
to improve the coverage and service of users. This aspect
will be beneficial, especially for devices operating at mm-
Waves, which are subject to strong attenuation effects, and
hence require in general LOS and proximity to the serving
gNB. In any case, however, research works tailored to the
investigation of the EMF levels due to the large adoption of
vertical densification in 5G are needed, both from theoretical
and practical sides. In particular, research works that analyze
the effect of densification not only for mobile users but also
for the public with exposure metrics that leverage both uplink
and downlink exposures.
In line with this trend, the exploitation of horizontal den-
sification is another key feature to target the EMF reduction
at an architectural level. The main goal of this approach is
to increase the number of gNBs over the territory [226], in
order to reduce the coverage size of each cell and (possibly)
the radiated power. Differently from the vertical densification,
which considers different types of gNB, the horizontal den-
sification is realized by increasing the number of gNBs of
the same type (e.g., only small cells). As already shown in
Sec.IV-B, the horizontal densification is not a threat for the
exposure levels, but rather an enabler for a low and uniform
EMF over the territory. Certainly, strict EMF regulations may
be a great barrier towards the horizontal densification of
5G networks. For example, in countries imposing minimum
distances between gNBs (of every type) and sensitive places,
horizontal densification will be a challenge, especially in
densely populated areas that include a multitude of sensi-
tive places. Although some previous research works try to
shed light on a preliminary evaluation of EMF levels from
horizontal densification in 5G networks [160], [227], [228],
future research is still needed, to properly take into account the
specific 5G features and the impact from the national exposure
regulations.
3) Network Offloading: The main idea of this approach
is to move the user traffic from cellular macro cells to
other wireless stations, e.g., Wi-Fi access points [229], small
cells [230], light-fidelity (Li-Fi) attocells [231], and Terahertz
access points [?], [232]–[234]. In the following, we provide
more details about Wi-Fi, small cell, and Li-Fi offloading
techniques.
Wi-Fi Offloading. Nowadays, Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi)
is undergoing a paradigm shift toward ubiquity, with
outdoor/city-wide wireless networks gaining continuous pop-
ularity. This trend is fueled by the release of the spectrum in
6 [GHz] band as an unlicensed spectrum [235]. In this sce-
nario, the Wi-Fi 6E networks will make use of the additional
spectrum, i.e., 1200 [MHz] in 6 [GHz] band, leading to higher
data rates and lower latency [236]. To ensure such performance
level, the Wi-Fi access points have to be deployed in proximity
to users. In this scenario, the cellular operator can offload
part of its own traffic to the Wi-Fi network. More in-depth,
three different offloading strategies can be applied, namely: i)
cellular network bypass [237], ii) managed offloading [238],
and iii) integrated Wi-Fi core network [239]. With the cellular
network bypass, the UE bypasses the mobile network by
offloading the whole amount of traffic into the Wi-Fi network.
With managed offloading, the operator manages a data session
over the Wi-Fi lower layers. Hence, it has more control over
the amount of offloaded traffic compared to the network bypass
case. Finally, in the integrated Wi-Fi core network, the Wi-Fi
access points are owned by the operator. Therefore, the traffic
always traverses the mobile core network, and the offloading
procedure is completely transparent to the user.
From an exposure perspective, it is clear that the three afore-
mentioned categories can greatly contribute in reducing the
EMF levels, especially in the uplink direction. Although the
number of works evaluating the benefits of Wi-Fi offloading in
terms of exposure for pre-5G networks is overall limited (see,
e.g., [240]), we believe that this architectural change could
be of great interest in the context of 5G communications.
Therefore, future works, tailored at the quantification of the
exposure reduction due to Wi-Fi offloading in 5G networks,
are needed.
Small Cell Offloading. The second approach to realize
offloading is to move the user traffic from macro cells to small
cells (including pico cells and femto cells). In this context,
the offloading is beneficial to the EMF exposure perspective
for several reasons. First of all, the transmitted power can be
greatly reduced [12]. In addition, differently from Wi-Fi, small
cells operate in licensed bands, and they are managed by the
network operator. Hence, the problems of the reliability of
the spectrum and integration issues are not so evident, as in
Wi-Fi based offloading. Third, the deployment costs of small
costs are consistently lower than those of macro cells, and
hence, small cells can be beneficial candidates for a pervasive
deployment in the context of 5G.
In the literature, different works [241]–[243] demonstrate
that small cell offloading introduces several positive effects
on the EMF levels from pre-5G networks. Thoroughly, a clear
reduction in the uplink radiated power is achieved [241], [243],
which can be coupled with a coordination of the inter-cell
interference [242]. However, as shown by [244], the exposure
in the downlink direction may be increased in proximity to
the small cells. Therefore, we advocate the need to continue
the research of exposure due to the small cell offloading in
the context of 5G. Possible avenues of research include the
investigation of the impact of traffic-aware offloading strate-
gies in dense 5G networks, where the amount of offloaded
data depends on the specific 5G applications run on the user
side. Also, the impact of handovers between small cells and
macro cells on the exposure should be thoroughly investigated,
e.g., by considering exposure-friendly small cell discovery
protocols [245].
Li-Fi Attocell Offloading. A recent technique to perform
offloading is to move the user traffic from macro or small cells
to what is called Li-Fi attocells. Li-Fi is an entire networking
system, similar in concept to WiFi, but it operates in the visible
light frequency band, in contrast to Wi-Fi that uses RF [246].
Working at such a high-frequency band allows tremendous
data rates due to the availability of large bandwidth. Neverthe-
less, as the frequency increases, the size of the cell decreases,
leading to cells with tiny coverage area, i.e., attocells [231].
From the EMF perspective, offloading through attocells has
more benefits compared to RF-based offloading techniques.
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The main reason is that Li-Fi technology relies on modulating
the light that is already used for the illumination; hence, no
additional RF waves are generated for data offloading, unlike
offloading through WiFi and small cells. Nevertheless, the UE
should be equipped with an additional transceiver consisting
of light emitting diodes (LEDs) and avalanche photodetectors
[247].
C. Network-based Approaches
The goal of network-based approaches is to tackle the risk
minimization of human exposure by devising solutions in
which the different 5G devices are jointly considered at a
network level in order to reduce the EMF exposure over the
territory. We divide the related literature into the following
categories: i) EMF-aware 5G cellular network planning, and
ii) EMF-aware resource management and communications
protocols.
1) EMF-aware Cellular Network Planning: The planning
of a cellular network under EMF constraints aims at selecting
the set of base stations that have to be installed over the
territory while ensuring economic feasibility for the operator,
EMF levels below the maximum limits, and coverage and
service constraints. Not surprisingly, this problem has already
been faced in the past years to design 2G/3G/4G networks
(see, e.g., [248] for the 3G case). Nevertheless, the planning
of 5G cellular networks is a novel and challenging step, as
pointed out by [12], [118]. The main reasons are that when
considering 5G communications, the set of new radio features
are introduced in this technology (e.g., in terms of MIMO,
beamforming, and mm-Waves), 5G planning is coupled with
the pervasive deployment of legacy technologies, and stringent
EMF regulations are adopted.
More technically, the planning phase of a 5G cellular
network requires the following input parameters: i) set of
candidate gNB locations which may host 5G equipment; ii) set
of possible configurations for each candidate gNB in terms of
e.g., equipment type, radio parameters (e.g., adopted carrier(s)
and bandwidth) and power parameters (e.g., maximum radia-
ted power, radiation pattern for each radiating antenna, du-
plexing ratio between uplink and downlink communications);
iii) terrain description in terms of elevation, 3D modeling of
buildings (including sensitive places) and obstacles (e.g., trees,
lamps, bus shelters), already deployed RF sources contributing
to the EMF (e.g., other base stations and/or TV/radio repeaters
and/or civil/military radars); iv) spatial-temporal positioning
of the users, v) minimum service constraints of users (by
considering also their trajectories over the territory), vi) set
of EMF limits and procedures to verify the EMF limits
currently enforced in the territory under consideration. Given
the aforementioned parameters, the network planning aims to
find the subset of gNBs that have to be installed over the
territory by balancing between the minimization of monetary
costs for operators, maximization of service to users, and
minimization of EMF levels over the territory. Clearly, a set
of constraint has to ensured, and namely: i) coverage over the
area by the installed gNB, ii) guaranteed service constraints
for users, iii) estimated EMF levels lower than the maximum
limits imposed by law.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest works targeting
the 5G network planning are [227], [228], [249]. Specifically,
the work of Oughton et al. [249] is tailored to the assessment
of the 5G planning by designing a new simulator, that can
produce as an output the set of 5G sites and their configura-
tions (e.g., in terms of radiating elements), by taking account
multiple features, including the spectrum portfolio and the
costs of the assets. However, the work is not tailored to the
specific radio features of 5G networks (e.g., MIMO, beam-
forming, densification) and their evaluation in terms of EMF.
In addition, irregular coverage layouts are not considered.
A cellular planning problem is also targeted by Matalala
et al. [227]. Specifically, the goal of the authors is to tackle
the trade-off between downlink power consumption, exposure
from base stations (BSs), and exposure from terminals cover-
age in a cellular network exploiting MIMO. The authors then
introduce two distinct objective functions, i.e., by considering
downlink and uplink exposure as two separate metrics or as a
single one. The problems are then heuristically solved on three
scenarios based on a suburban area in Belgium. Results show
that the number of users in the scenario strongly affects the
exposure from gNB. In addition, the increase in the number
of antennas elements triggers a decrease in downlink exposure
and an increase in the uplink one. Moreover, the selected
5G planning achieves the same performance in terms of user
coverage w.r.t. a 4G planning, coupled with a strong reduction
in downlink exposure.
Eventually, Matalala et al. [228] focus on the problem
of selecting the subset of MIMO BSs that minimizes the
total power consumption, while ensuring coverage and ca-
pacity constraints. The considered scenarios include MIMO
5G configurations, as well as a reference one based on Long
Term Evolution (LTE) technology. In addition, the problem is
heuristically solved on a custom simulator. Results reveal that
the increase in the number of deployed MIMO antennas can re-
duce the total power consumption compared to a 4G reference
network while dramatically increasing the capacity offered to
users. Moreover, the MIMO effectiveness in crowded scenarios
with limited mobility emerges.
Although we recognize the importance of [227], [228], we
believe that substantial work is still needed to fully investigate
the problem of 5G planning in the context of exposure
minimization. To this aim, future research may be tailored
to: i) a precise modelling of the key 5G features in terms
of EMF levels, ii) the investigation of the EMF levels by
considering the deterministic positions of the users over the
territory and the beam configuration of gNBs in order to
serve the users, iii) the evaluation of the impact of strict EMF
constraints (e.g., exposure limits stricter than ICNIRP ones
and/or presence of sensitive areas) on the obtained planning,
iv) the evaluation of the 5G planning by taking into account
the influence of legacy technologies (e.g., 2G/3G/4G) on the
combined exposure levels.
Finally, we recognize that the EMF-aware 5G cellular
network planning is typically solved by network operators
thanks to the exploitation of commercial solutions (see, e.g.,
[250]). However, we advocate the need to closely involving
the research community (including academia) on this aspect.
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On one side, in fact, innovative models to estimate exposure
from 5G features could be defined. On the other hand, results
obtained by organizations without economic ties to the prob-
lem may be a winning solution to publicly for demonstrating
the benefits introduced by an accurate 5G planning on the
exposure levels.
2) EMF-aware Resource Allocation and Communications
Protocols: In general, the level of EMF exposure is affected
by the amount of radio resources assigned to the user, e.g.,
time, frequency, and power, along with the considered commu-
nication protocols in different layers, e.g., physical, data link,
network, and transport layers. Hence, efficient radio resource
allocation schemes and communication protocols that aim at
minimizing the exposure while preserving a target QoS can
be interesting and effective solutions for risk minimization
(see, e.g, [251] for the SAR case). This problem is similar,
albeit not identical, to the well-established research of green
communications [252]. The main difference between EMF-
aware and energy-efficient approaches is that the first ones
mainly focus on the exposure metrics that are closely related
to the transmitted power from BSs and UE. On the other hand,
the second approaches aim at minimizing the energy efficiency
(e.g., in terms of joule/bit), including not only the energy
spent in communications but also the energy that is consumed
within the hardware components of gNB and UE. Although
we recognize the importance of green communications, we
consider henceforth the main works that are explicitly tailored
to the EMF-aware resource management and communications
protocols [253]–[259].
In this regard, [253] details a user-scheduling approach to
reduce the uplink exposure in TDMA systems. The proposed
solution manages the scheduling of the user transmissions
depending on their total transmitted power in the past frames,
leading to a reduction in the user transmitted power and
consequently limiting the uplink exposure. Focusing then on
OFDM based systems, which are typically exploited in Fourth-
generation cellular network (4G) and 5G, the authors of
[254] propose two resource allocation schemes in order to
minimize uplink exposure, while guaranteeing a pre-defined
throughput for each user. More in-depth, the first approach is
an offline algorithm that makes use of the availability of long
term channel state information (CSI), while the second one
is an online scheme that adopts the current CSI estimation.
Results demonstrate that the proposed approaches are able to
consistently reduce the user transmitted power compared to
traditional solutions that solely maximize the spectral and/or
power efficiency. The authors’ work is further extended in
[260] to the multi-cell scheduling case, confirming the positive
outcomes in terms of uplink exposure reduction.
Focusing then on the downlink exposure, the authors of
[255] design an algorithm for the exposure-aware association
of UE to gNBs. Interestingly, results show that the exposure in
massive MIMO 5G networks is almost one order of magnitude
lower than the corresponding one from LTE systems with the
same network coverage. However, the number of deployed
gNBs in the 5G network is almost double than the one required
in the LTE networks. This increase is justified by the authors
of [255] due to the decrease of the downlink transmitted power
of each antenna element in 5G w.r.t. 4G.
An influential aspect of controlling the EMF in cellular
networks, exploiting beamforming (like 5G), is the design of
beams. To this aim, the authors of [261] propose an algorithm
to compute the beamforming vector to reduce uplink exposure.
More precisely, the proposed solution can increase the antenna
gains of the beams in the direction of the BS, while decreasing
the localized SAR on the head. Eventually, the authors in
[262] take into account both SAR and transmit power in the
beamformer optimization process, showing that this approach
allows a substantial performance improvement over schemes
that are derived from solely power constraints.
The EMF reduction methods discussed so far are employed
in the physical layer. However, the EMF exposure can also be
minimized by considering higher layers, e.g., media access
control (MAC), link, and transport layers. In this regard,
a cross-layer EMF reduction approach combining features
from physical and link layers is proposed in [256]. More
specifically, an EMF-aware hybrid Automatic Repeat Request
(ARQ) protocol is designed to minimize the number of re-
transmissions, and consequently, the transmitted power, along
with the latency. This methodology could be applied to the
Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications (URLLC) use
case of 5G with efficient power transmission. On the other
hand, [257], [258] investigate cross-layer approaches based
on link and transport layers to target the decrease of EMF
exposure in LTE networks. The solution proposed in [257]
prioritizes the radio link control frames according to their
significance in terms of QoS for video transmission over LTE.
This approach can limit the number of re-transmissions for
the non-critical frames, reducing the transmission power and,
consequently, the EMF exposure. Eventually, the authors of
[258] show that the cooperation between transport and link
layers allows reducing the number of re-transmissions of non-
critical data in video transmissions, which in turn decreases
the uplink exposure, without jeopardizing the perceived QoS.
Although the previous approaches are promising in terms
of exposure reduction, future works, tailored to the specific
layers that will be implemented in 5G (and consequently to
the standardized features in this technology), are needed.
D. Regulation-based Approaches
The goal of regulation-based approaches is to enforce a
change in the current EMF regulations to ease the installa-
tion of 5G networks while ensuring exposure limitation. In
general, these solutions are pursued by decision-makers (e.g.,
national governments and international organizations), with a
significant impact on the exposure levels.
1) Dismission of Legacy 2G/3G/4G Technologies: The de-
ployment of 5G networks is currently done in parallel to the
already deployed pre-5G systems. In a scenario where multiple
RF sources already radiate over the same territory, and also in
the presence of strict EMF regulations, the installation of 5G
gNB is a challenging step, due to the fact there is a small room
to install new gNB while ensuring the strict EMF constraints.
To this aim, a possible solution could be the dismission of
legacy 2G/3G/4G networks in favor of the adoption of 5G
equipment.
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Fig. 18. Evolution over the years of the measurement equipment to perform wide-scale EMF (photos by Richard A. Tell). The reduction of equipment size
is essential to allow extensive EMF measurements from 5G gNBs.
Although this approach could be a great driver for the full
exploitation of 5G technologies, its actual applicability is not a
trivial task. For example, even by assuming the sole dismission
of 2G networks, all the services currently in use by this
technology will have to shift to 5G. This would include, e.g.,
most home alarm systems currently communicating through
2G interfaces, as well as voice services, which are still
exploiting 2G in many countries. Even by assuming a smooth
replacement of UE and other terminals with 5G interfaces,
the deployed 5G radio access infrastructure should guarantee
at least the same level of coverage provided by the 2G network
that is dismissed. Despite these constraints, we believe that the
disposal of the legacy technologies should be calendared in the
activity list of national governments. This step could include,
e.g., an incremental and selective dismission of pre-5G net-
works, where the legacy radio technologies are maintained in
parallel to the deployment of the 5G network, for an amount of
time defined in the regulations. As a step toward this goal, an
operator in Netherlands has recently dismissed its 3G network,
where the majority of users utilizes 4G instead of 3G services
[263].13
2) Harmonization of Exposure Limits and Assessment of
Compliance Procedures: As discussed in Sec. III-C and in
Sec. III-D, the jeopardization of exposure limits as well as of
the methodologies to assess the exposure compliance w.r.t.
the exposure limits are a great barrier towards a uniform
deployment of 5G networks in the world. Even when con-
sidering countries adopting international guidelines, there are
clear differences that emerge, e.g., on the maximum limit
values, the adopted metrics, and the assessment of compliance
methodologies. In this scenario, it is desirable that interna-
tional organizations will continue to promote harmonization
procedures, which should be implemented in the national re-
gulations. For example, in countries adopting strict regulations,
the application of international guidelines (and consequently
less strict limits), would ease the installation of 5G equipment
over the territory. However, we recognize that this choice
introduces non-negligible consequences at the political levels,
as the risk levels perceived by the population may be increased
due to the change of the exposure limits.
13We would like to note that dismissing 3G cellular systems, and replacing
them with 5G for data services could be easier than dismissing 2G networks.
3) Reduction of Emissions from non-Cellular RF Sources:
The emissions from radio and TV stations represent the largest
contributions to human exposure [170], [171], especially for
people living in proximity of radio and/or TV towers [64].
In the context of 5G deployment, it would be advisable to
take counter-measures and reduce exposure from such non-
cellular RF sources. Although the population does not gener-
ally associate high health risks to radio and TV towers (due to
the fact that these technologies are in use for many decades),
the reduction of exposure from these sources would ease the
installation of the 5G equipment over the territory. Clearly, the
services running on the legacy radio / TV architectures should
be shifted to other technologies (e.g., satellites) or be included
in 5G. In any case, however, the complete replacement of
radio/TV equipment with 5G one is a challenging step.
4) Deployment of Pervasive EMF Measurement Campaigns
and Data Integration: The high exposure dynamicity intro-
duced by the novel 5G features (e.g., MIMO and beamform-
ing), coupled with the exploitation of relatively new frequen-
cies in the mm-Wave band, require to setup novel methodolo-
gies for the measurement and analysis of 5G exposure from
gNBs. In particular, the implementation of continuous and
pervasive EMF measurements from 5G gNBs is crucial to face
the perceived health risks from the population. Although the
EMF meters have been continuously decreased in size and
usage complexity in the last decades (as shown in Fig. 18),
professional EMF meters are not intended to be used by
the general public, due to several reasons. On one side, in
fact, such devices are subject to high purchase costs, which
introduce significant economic barriers against the deployment
of pervasive measurement campaigns exploiting a vast number
of meters. On the other hand, advanced technical skills are
required to perform valid measurements, e.g., to avoid mea-
surement errors and EMF contributions from other RF sources
apart from gNB in the measurement campaign. As a result, the
measurement activity is often performed by the technicians
of EMF protection agencies. Clearly, assuming that these
agencies will ensure a pervasive EMF monitoring for every
location of the territory covered by 5G service is not realistic.
In this context, the selection of a meaningful set of sites
to concentrate EMF measurements will be an engaging and
challenging future goal. Again, we believe that this problem
can be solved with the help of the communications engineering
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community. For example, novel techniques for wide spectrum
monitoring can be achieved by using sub-Nyquist analog-to-
digital converters (ADCs) exploiting the sparsity and spatio-
temporal structures of the measurements, in the context of
compressed sensing [264]–[271].
A second aspect, which is often underestimated by the po-
pulation, is related to the great benefits that could be achieved
from the integration of the EMF measurements on common
platforms at national and international levels. Providing a
uniform set of interfaces to store, visualize, and analyze the
EMF measurements from 5G devices (and especially from 5G
gNB) would ease the reduction of the health risks perceived by
the population. In addition, the sharing of the measurements
across different communities would improve the knowledge
about 5G exposure by allowing, e.g., the discovery of com-
mon exposure patterns and the presence of outliers/anomalies.
However, this step requires effective coordination between the
EMF protection agencies at the national level, as well as
the integration of the measured data between the different
countries. Eventually, we point out that this goal is being
undertaken in some countries (see, e.g., [80] for the Italian
case).
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have performed an in-depth analysis of the health risks
associated with 5G exposure by adopting the perspective of 5G
communications engineering. Initially, we have concentrated
on the health effects, by analyzing the central allegations of
diseases linked to 5G exposure and by debunking the false
claims and hoaxes. Besides, we have applied key concepts
of communications engineering to review recent animal-based
studies, demonstrating that the claimed health effects about
the carcinogenicity of RF radiation can not be applied to
5G gNBs and 5G UE. Moreover, we have examined the
population-based studies relevant to 5G, showing that their
methodologies have to be deeply revised when considering
5G communications.
In the second part of our work, we have analyzed the
basic metrics to characterize 5G exposure, in terms of in-
cident EMF strength, PD, and SAR. We have then moved
our attention to the PD/EMF/SAR limits that are defined
by international organizations (IEEE, ICNIRP) and federal
commissions (FCC), by also reporting a timely detailed com-
parison between the latest guidelines set in 2019-2020 against
the previously adopted ones. To this aim, we recognize that the
limits are pretty heterogeneous across the different authorities,
although a harmonization effort appears for a subset of the
considered metrics. In the following part, we have deeply
analyzed the national regulations in more than 220 countries
in the world, coupled with the actual deployment level of
5G technology. Overall, our picture reveals that there is a
massive fragmentation of rules across the different countries
(especially for gNB deployment), with many of these countries
with unknown limits and no plans to deploy 5G, as well
as a non-negligible amount of world population subject to
strict exposure regulations. Clearly, for countries that adopt
limits more stringent than ICNIRP/FCC ones, deploying the
5G networks and minimizing the perceived risks are two
conflicting goals. Finally, we have analyzed in detail the
different procedures defined by IEEE, IEC, and ITU to assess
compliance of 5G exposure against the limits. Overall, we
have found that the definition level of these approaches is
already mature to be implemented in practice, although some
guidelines have to be officially finalized.
In the third part of the paper, we have faced the main con-
cerns associated with key 5G features, including: i) extensive
adoption of MIMO and beamforming, ii) densification of 5G
sites over the territory, iii) adoption of frequencies in the mm-
Wave bands, iv) connection of millions of IoT devices and
v) coexistence of 5G with legacy technologies. By applying
sounds concepts of communications engineering to review the
related literature, we have shown that such features do not
represent in general a threat to the population health.
Finally, the last part of our work has been devoted to the
review of the main approaches that can be targeted to reduce
the exposure from 5G gNBs and 5G UE, thus minimizing the
perceived health risks. We have analyzed solutions working
at the device, architectural, network, and regulation levels in-
depth. Although some efforts have already been considered
in the literature to reduce the 5G exposure, we have pointed
out different avenues that could be followed in the future to
achieve this goal fully. In particular, the role of the national
governments in defining regulation-based solutions appears
fundamental at this stage.
In conclusion, our work suggests that the health concerns
about the deployment of 5G gNBs of 5G UE are not supported
by communications engineering evidence. Therefore, there is
no compelling motivation to stop the deployment of 5G net-
works, especially when precautionary principles are applied.
However, we point out the importance of continuing to re-
search possible health effects (not proven at the present time),
associated with the realistic exposure (i.e., below maximum
limits) of 5G devices. Clearly, we advocate further research
works that aim to design exposure-aware cellular networks
for 5G and beyond systems properly.
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